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STOCK MARKET, CORPORATIONS AND THEIR
REGULATION: A FEW GLIMPSES INTO REALITY
P.M. Vasudev*
Now a frank gale of wind go with him, Master Frank, we
have too few such knight adventurers. Who would not
sell away competent uncertainties, to purchase, with any
danger, excellent uncertainties? Your true knight
venturer ever does it.
~ Eastward Ho (1605)
Public corporations and the stock market have verily emerged as the
symbols of the present age, and are among the important institutions in the
society. Indeed, the state of the stock market is understood as the
barometer of general well-being. The law has a crucial role with respect
to both corporations and stock market, and this paper examines how the
legal regime for corporations and the stock market influences corporate
governance and events in the stock market. This is done through a casestudy of events at three public corporations – Enron Corp., Sycamore
Networks and Amazon.com.
The paper is divided into five parts of which the first part sets out the
theme of the paper, and explains the perspective of the analysis. The next
three parts deal respectively with events in Enron, Sycamore Networks
and Amazon.com. The concluding part articulates the tendencies
engendered and encouraged by the present regime, and argues that we
need a better and more reasonable theory for both the institutions – public
corporations and the stock market. A sound and reasonable theoretical
foundation, which reflects the knowledge we have gained from our
experience with them and defines with some clarity the role we expect
*

Ph. D. Candidate, Osgoode Hall Law School, Sr. Lecturer, Department of Commercial
Law, The University of Auckland. The original research for this paper was supported by
the Institute for International Corporate Governance and Accountability at The George
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gratefully acknowledges the support and encouragement extended by IICGA and its
Founder-Director, Prof. Lawrence E. Mitchell of The George Washington University
Law School.
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them to play, is a prerequisite for public policy to effectively guide these
institutions, and minimize the conflict between them and larger public and
social interests.

A. STATE OF CORPORATE LAW AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Business corporations are legal entities organized under statutes.
Delaware, with its loose corporate statute,1 is the popular choice of
jurisdiction for most listed corporations, and the ones selected for study
here – namely, Enron, Sycamore Networks and Amazon.com are all
Delaware corporations.2
Delaware corporate statute engineers
corporations almost purely as issuers of securities meant for trade in the
stock market, and adopts a policy of encouraging trade in securities in the
market.3 It has adopted a philosophy of minimalism with respect to the
administration of corporations, and eschews efforts to regulate them.4 In
result, a Delaware corporation can virtually be whatever it decides to be.5
* Sr. Lecturer, Department of Commercial Law, The University of Auckland. The
original research for this paper was supported by the Institute for International Corporate
Governance and Accountability at The George Washington University Law School
(IICGA), Washington, D.C., and the author gratefully acknowledges the support and
encouragement extended by IICGA and its Founder-Director, Prof. Lawrence E. Mitchell
of The George Washington University Law School.
1

Delaware Code, Title 8, Chapter 1.

2

Enron Corporation was originally formed in 1930 Nebraksa, and it is not clear if it was
originally incorporated in Delaware. Amazon.com was incorporated in 1994 in
Washington, but shifted to Delaware before it made its public issue in 1997. Only
Sycamore Networks, a company formed in 1998 during the Internet boom in the stock
market, was incorporated in Delaware.
3

See generally P.M. Vasudev, “Capital Stock, Its Shares and Their Holders: A
Comparison of India and Delaware” Worldwide Junior Corporate Scholars Forum
Conference, March 2007 Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=913282, June
2007.

4

See generally William Cary, “Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon
Delaware” (1974) 83 Yale L.J. 663.
5

The present state of permissiveness in American corporate law is very different from the
highly regulatory environment in which corporations operated for about a hundred years
from the formation of the United States in the 1770s until the 1880s. See generally J.W.
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A powerful school of opinion favours the present corporate arrangement
outlined above, and views it as the ideal, a state of perfection.6 Terming
the Delaware statute as an “enabling” one, representatives of this school
note appreciatively that it facilitates corporations to “write their own
tickets, to establish systems of governance without substantive scrutiny
from a regulator and without effective restraint on the permissible methods
of corporate governance.”7 In result, corporate law has no influence on
corporate governance for all practical purposes.
When companies are thus free to devise their own systems of governance,
the question of incentives and rewards becomes important. What are the
incentives which influence public corporations in selecting their
governance systems? The answer to this question is, undoubtedly, the
stock market in which the shares of companies are traded. The stock
market has a position of pre-eminence in the present arrangement, and the
prices which company shares command in the market are a powerful
influence on corporations. Achieving increases in share prices, termed
“shareholder value,” is considered a legitimate corporate objective, and
managements constantly strive for it. Indeed, the performance of
corporate managements is measured by the increase in share prices.8
In making decisions and taking actions, corporations are strongly guided
by the consideration of how their decisions and actions would be received
Hurst, The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation in the Law of the United States 17801970 (Charlottesville, Va.: University Press of Virginia, 1970).
6

For a scholarly debate on whether corporate and securities laws must be regulatory, see
papers presented at the symposium, Norms and Corporate Law, (2001) 149 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1607-2179.

7

Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, “The Corporate Contract” (1989) 89
Colum. L. Rev. 1416 at 1417.

8

Jack Welch of General Electric is considered an exceptionally successful CEO, and this
is mostly due to the “shareholder value” that he was able to achieve. In 1980 when Jack
Welch became the head of General Electric, its market capitalization, meaning the
aggregate value of its outstanding shares in the stock market, was $ 14 billion. It had
risen to $ 490 billion when he retired in 2001. Rob Walker, “Overvalued: Why Jack
Welch isn’t God?” The New Republic, 11 June 2001, also available online:
http://www.robwalker.net/html_docs/welch.html, June 2007.
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in the stock market, and how they would impact share prices. In this stock
market-centric arrangement, market reaction is a primary consideration for
corporate managements. The theory is that the stock market would reward
good corporate performance with increase in share prices, and conversely,
punish bad performance by lowering prices. This phenomenon is termed
“market discipline,” and is affirmed as an article of faith.9 In this schema,
the business of a corporation is, at best, collateral, and the stock market
enjoys the primary position. Corporate business is relevant only to the
extent that it influences share prices. In consequence, the business theme
of corporations is undermined, and the financial theme gains ascendancy.

B. ISSUE OF SHARES AND GRANT OF OPTIONS BY COMPANIES
The capital stock, representing the pooled resources of many persons, can
be termed the core of modern business corporations. Corporations issued
shares, being units of capital stock, for raising the capital required for their
business purposes. The shares had par values, and could only be issued
for adequate consideration. Victor Morawetz (1882) accurately summed
up the underlying principle when he observed:
Every shareholder in a corporation is entitled to insist that every
other shareholder shall contribute his ratable part of the company’s
capital for common benefit.10
If this were to be the guiding principle, there would be little question of
companies issuing shares at varying levels of consideration to different
persons. Nor could companies, at their discretion, grant stock options
which entitle their holders to convert them into shares. In this setup, the
capital stock of a corporation is treated with sanctity, and the idea that a
9

See e.g. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). “The
Roles of Market Discipline and Transparency in Corporate Governance Policy” (Paper
presented by William Wetherell, Director for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs,
OECD, at the Banque de France International Monetary Seminar, 16 May 2003),
available online: www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/4/2717763.pdf, June 2007.
10

Victor Morawetz, A Treatise on the Law of Private Corporations, 2d ed. (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1886), Vol. 1, at p. 269.
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person must pay his or her “ratable part” in order to acquire shares of
capital stock is the central principle.
The observation of Morawetz also explains the rationale for voting rights
in corporations. Contributors of capital had voting rights in proportion to
the capital contributed by them, and the voting rights empowered them to
elect or remove the directors who managed the corporations. Shareholders
also held most of the other important powers in corporations.11 Shares
were recognized as valuable, and their issue was closely supervised in
law.12
But these principles were gradually discarded in American corporate law
beginning from later nineteenth century, and the law gradually permitted
corporations to freely issue shares. The requirement of par value for
shares was discontinued. Although the principle that consideration must
be paid for shares is retained, the standards are diluted to the point of
meaninglessness. Any amount of consideration determined by the
directors is accepted, subject to the exception of fraud.13 Companies are
also free to issue rights and options with respect to their stock and
determine the terms of such rights and options.14 By early twentieth
century, the loose position with respect to issue of shares and options by
companies, outlined above, had emerged, and Roscoe Pound compared the
grant of options by companies to feudal lords distributing estates.15

11

For a description of shareholder rights in American corporate law until 1880s, see
Morton J. Horwitz, “Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory”
(1985) 88 W. Va. L. Rev. 173.

12

See generally Adolf A. Berle, “Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust” (1930) 44 Harv.
L. Rev. 1049 at p. 1050-1060.

13

Delaware General Corporation Law, Section 152.

14

Ibid. Section 157.

15

Roscoe Pound, “The New Feudalism” (Address delivered at the Annual Meeting of the
Kentucky Bar Association, 1930) (1930) 35 Com.L.J. 397.
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The shares of listed companies have market value and salability in the
stock market. They also have voting and participation rights.16 Voting
rights entitle shareholders to elect or remove the directors who are in
charge of corporate management, and participation rights place
shareholders in a proprietary position with respect to the assets of
companies. Ignoring these crucial characteristics, corporate law has
discontinued the traditional circumspection with which it treated the shares
of companies. Now, it casually empowers corporations to deal with their
shares virtually as they please. The events at Sycamore and Amazon.com,
discussed in the paper, demonstrate some of the implications of the
prevailing loose legal position.

C. THE STOCK MARKET AND ITS REGULATION
We have noted that share prices in the stock market are understood as the
disciplining factor for corporations,17 and this leads us to the questions,
how are share prices supposed to be determined in the stock market and
how is the market to be regulated? These questions are especially relevant
given the history of speculation in the stock market and its habit of
determining irrational share prices. These issues with the stock market are
hardly secrets, and have been well-known from early eighteenth century
when England had its brush with the South Sea Bubble in 1720.18
16

Participation rights of shareholders, termed “residual claim” in economic theory, entitle
them to the assets of a company remaining after all its other liabilities have been provided
for or met.

17

Mercifully, even the most ardent advocates of libertarianism, mainly the law-andeconomic scholars, do not argue that there is no need to discipline companies. It is only
that they profess faith in a crude carrot-and-stick approach that emphasizes the negative
traits in human character, and attempt to appeal only to such qualities. This is given the
term “liberty,” but this version could not be further removed from the ideal of liberty
expounded by thinkers like John Locke (1632-1704) and Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826).

18

“South Sea Bubble” refers to the boom in the London stock market in 1720, initiated
by runaway increases in the price of the shares of South Sea Company. The boom soon
spread to other shares, and the market was in frenzy. However, the market collapsed
after a few months, causing all round economic decline. For a recent account of the
South Sea Bubble, see Edward Chancellor, Devil Take the Hindmost: A History of
Financial Speculation (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1999).
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In the 1840s when the first corporate statute was enacted in Britain,19 it
introduced a system of disclosures by companies. Companies had to make
disclosures both at the time of issue of shares by them and on an ongoing
basis, and this regime was adopted in the United States in the 1930s when
federal laws were enacted for regulation of the stock market.20 The federal
regulations mandate extensive disclosures by companies, and the theory is
that the market will apply the information disclosed by companies to
determine the prices of their shares.
The informational regime in which companies must make disclosures is
the lynchpin of securities regulations. Other than disclosures, securities
regulations also deal with specific issues which affect the integrity of the
stock market, such as trading by company insiders and market
manipulation. These other provisions, such as those dealing with insider
trading and manipulation, are special devices for checking specific and
known ills in the market. The informational regime, on the other hand,
defines the philosophy of the market, and is intended to promote market
order on an ongoing basis, by making information available and
facilitating the discovery of share prices.

D. THE INFORMATIONAL REGIME AND EFFICIENT MARKETS – AN
OUTLINE
The informational regime, as we have seen, requires extensive disclosures
by corporations, and its rationale has been described in the following
words:
19

Joint Stock Companies Registration and Regulation Act, 1844, 7 & 8 Vict., c. 110 &
111 (U.K.).

20

A system of financial reporting by public companies was being gradually developed in
United States when the securities laws were enacted and made the reports mandatory. In
this sense, the securities statutes only gave legal shape to the practices that had already
emerged in the market. For an account of the development of the informational regime in
Britain since mid-nineteenth century and its adoption in the United States in the 1930s,
see P.M. Vasudev, “Equity Pricing, the Informational Regime and Efficient Markets: A
Historical
Perspective”
(February
2007).
Available
at
SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=969751, June 2007.
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In a word, a respectable open market appraisal, based on a
compromise between the opinions of willing buyers and willing
sellers was what was actually required.
Appraisal necessarily turns on information. If the open market
view was to approximate a judgment of worth, it became essential
that some material for such judgment should be provided.21
Regulation mandates extensive corporate disclosures towards this end.
Companies must file quarterly and annual reports with extensive financial
and other business data and information.22 The recently-enacted SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 continues with the same theme of disclosure, and goes
further. It provides for “real-time disclosure,” and companies must make
immediate disclosure of important developments.23 As Loss and Seligman
put it, “[t]here is the recurrent theme throughout these statutes of
disclosure, again disclosure, and still more disclosure.”24
Taking a cue from the informational regime, a section in the economics
discipline, with doctrinaire loyalty to the principle of laissez-faire and the
perfection of market processes, formulated the Efficient Markets
Hypothesis a few decades later. Eugene Fama, a leading proponent of the
Hypothesis, explained:
An "efficient" market is defined as a market where there are large
numbers of rational, profit-maximizers actively competing, with
each trying to predict future market values of individual securities,
and where important current information is almost freely available
to all participants.
21

This description of the informational regime is by Adolf A. Berle, whose writings
played an important role in the adoption of the regime in the United States in the 1930s.
Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932) at p. 293.

22

Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. Section 13.

23

Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, Section 409.

24

Louis Loss and Joel Seligman, Fundamentals of Securities Regulations, 5th ed.
(Frederick, Md: Aspen, 2004) at p. 8.
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In an efficient market, competition among the many intelligent
participants leads to a situation where, at any point in time, actual
prices of individual securities already reflect the effects of
information based both on events that have already occurred and
on events which, as of now, the market expects to take place in the
future. In other words, in an efficient market at any point in time
the actual price of a security will be a good estimate of its intrinsic
value.25
The Efficient Market Hypothesis predicates that the market will apply the
information disclosed by companies and arrive at prices that reflect the
“intrinsic value” of the shares of various companies. The limited role
which the informational regime seeks to play is making information
available to the market and facilitating price determination by the market.

E. CASES SELECTED FOR STUDY
The cases selected for study in the paper – Enron, Sycamore and
Amazon.com – all bring out the clear intersection between the stock
market and corporate governance. They deal with the twin aspects of
market efficiency and corporate governance, and explain corporate and
stock market tendencies.
1. ENRON

Enron, an established energy company, experienced steep increases in its
share prices during 1996-2001. The case of Enron is selected for three
reasons:
•
•

25

Asymmetry between the business progress reported by the
company and the rise in its share prices.
Business adventurism on the part of Enron in the final years of its
existence. Inspired by the high valuations given by the stock
market to the shares of technology companies, Enron ventured into

Eugene Fama, “Random Walks in Stock Market Prices” (1965) 21 Financial Analysts
Journal 55 at p. 56.
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the broadband business in 1999, and spending hundreds of millions
of dollars. This was two years before it filed for bankruptcy in
2001, and raises questions about corporate responsibility and
accountability, and the incentives offered by the stock market.
Increasing stock market-centricity of governance practices at
Enron, personified by the application of share prices, rather than
business results as the yardstick to assess managerial performance.

2. SYCAMORE NETWORKS

Sycamore Networks was founded in 1998 at the height of the Internet
boom in the stock market and made two public issues in a span of seven
months in 1999-2000, at the height of the boom. The case of Sycamore is
remarkable for the following reasons:
•
•
•

•

The readiness of the investors, during the Internet boom, to pour
money into the company despite the admitted fact that it had no
business purpose for which it needed to raise capital.
Acquisition of shares by the insiders at a low price, and subsequent
sale at high prices in the public issue.
Subversion of the principle of disclosure in the statutory filings of
Sycamore, and demonstrating how the principle can be used to
protect managements against legal action, rather than inform the
investors.
Finally, the mismatch between the business results reported by the
company and the rise in its share prices during 1999-2000. Events
in the market undermine the theory of the informational regime,
and refute the Efficient Markets Hypothesis.

3. AMAZON.COM

Amazon.Com, another technology company and a pioneer in electronic
commerce, is selected for its demonstration of the following:
•

•

Amazon.com made a small public issue in 1997 during the Internet
boom, and got its shares listed on stock exchanges. Like
Sycamore, Amazon.com also exaggerated the risk factors, and used
it mostly to protect the interests of the management.
By taking advantage of the listing of its shares, Amazon.com
issued shares of the value of over a billion dollars to acquire new
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businesses. But in the next three years, it almost completely
eliminated the businesses acquired by it, by writing off their value
from its balance sheet. We look at the implications of the freedom
allowed in law for such practices.
Like in the case of Sycamore Networks, increases in the price of
Amazon.com shares were contrary to the dismal business results
reported by it. The additional feature in the case of Amazon.com
is that the market was also apparently guided by the predictions of
an investment analyst, Henry Blodget, and repeatedly increased the
prices of Amazon.Com shares, despite the bleak results reported by
the company. The behaviour of the market, in the context of the
prediction made by Henry Blodget, demonstrates the grip that
sentiment, rather than concrete information has on the stock
market.

A common thread that runs through the tales of all the three companies is
the significant dichotomy between their statutory reports on the one hand,
and the other communications issued by them, on the other. Forecasts and
statements in the statutory reports are, at best, sober and sedate (Enron),
and at worst, gloomy and cynical (Sycamore Networks and Amazon.com).
But other communications released by the companies around the same
time, such as press releases and letters to shareholders, were bubbling with
enthusiasm and optimism about the future. The contrast between the two
sets of information from the companies raises questions about which set of
information guides the stock market.

II. ENRON CORP.
Enron Corp., founded in 1930, is a company of longstanding. It belonged
to what might be termed the “old world” business culture where value was
derived largely from physical assets such as land, buildings and plants, and
actual earnings. Enron filed for bankruptcy towards the end of 2001. The
1990s, which was the last decade of its business existence, were eventful
in the history of the company. In particular, the last five years since 1996
were marked by hectic activity. Enron’s volume of business operations,
assets, and share prices all rose to great heights in this short period, before

12
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the dramatic collapse towards the end of 2001.26 The events in this period
are examined here from the perspective of the three issues outlined above
– namely, share prices and disclosures, corporate business freedom and the
incentives offered to Enron management.

A. SHARE PRICES AND DISCLOSURES
We are informed by efficient market theorists that “actual prices of
individual securities already reflect the effects of information based both
on events that have already occurred and on events which, as of now, the
market expects to take place in the future.”27 This indicates that prices are
based on two sets of data – corporate financial statements that provide
information on “events that have already occurred,” and forecasts made by
companies about their future prospects. The forecasts would be an
important input for the market to predict the events which it “expects to
take place in the future.” In recognition of these factors, regulation
requires companies to submit reports on their past – namely, the financial
statements,28 and forecasts for the future.29
The years from 1996 onwards were, as noted earlier, eventful for Enron.
The table below has the business data and share prices of Enron in the
period 1996-2000.30 In October 2001, Enron revised its business results
for these years, and they are considered a little later.
26

For a comprehensive account of the business practices of Enron, its efforts to influence
energy regulation and the factors and developments that caused the subsequent fall of
Enron, see Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Roaring Nineties: The Seeds of Destruction (London:
Allen Lane/Penguin, 2003).

27

Eugene Fama, Note 25, above.

28

Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 13.

29

Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Regulation S-B, 17 CFR Part 228, Item
303.

30

Data taken from Enron annual reports in Form 10-K, filed with Securities and
Exchange Commission. The reports for each fiscal year are filed after the end of the
year, in the early part of the next year. Available online: www.sec.gov, under “Company
Filings,” CIK “0001024401.” For 1996, see under CIK “0000072859.” May 2007.
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Table 1
Enron Corp.
Business Data and Share Prices 1996-2000 – An Analysis
Description
Earnings on
Common
Stock
($ Million)
Earnings Per
Share ($)
Dividend Per
Share ($)
Price Range
per Share ($)
Dividend as
% of Peak
Share Price
Outstanding
Common
Shares
(Million)
Shareholders’
Equity
($ Million)
Market
Capitalization
at Peak Share
Price
($ Million)
Earnings as
% of Market
Capitalization

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

568

88

686

827

896

2.31

0.32

2.14

2.34*

2.44*

0.86

0.91

0.96

1.00

1.00

35 – 48

35 – 45

38 – 59

29 – 90*

42 – 182*

2.45%

2.02%

1.62%

1.11%

0.55%

251

307

331

358*

376

3,723

5,618

7,048

9,570

11,470

8,785

13,815

19,529

32,220

68,432

6.46%

0.64%

3.51%

2.57%

1.31%

* Enron made a two-for-one stock split in August 1999. The figures for
1999 and 2000 in the Table are adjusted for the stock split.

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

14

[VOL. 04 NO. 01

The growth in the earnings on common stock and other fundamentals
during the five-year period was consistent, except for a setback in 1997.
There were hardly any dramatic improvements in the business
fundamentals of Enron during the five-year period in which peak share
prices, adjusted for the split rose from $ 48 to $ 182. We can interpret
the business data and prices of Enron shares in the following terms, to
assess the informational efficiency of prices in the stock market.

31

•

Price/earnings ratio, which interprets share prices in terms of the
earnings of companies, is an important tool for evaluating
investments, and it is supposed to influence the price determination
in the market. The earnings of Enron grew by about 57 percent
during the five years, but the increase in peak share price was 404
percent in the same period.31

•

Price/dividend ratio measures the price of shares in terms of the
dividend paid by companies, and is another tool for determining
the investment value of shares. The dividend paid by Enron on its
common shares during 1996-2000 was, by no means, impressive,
and the price/dividend ratio showed consistent decline, from 2.45
percent in 1996 to 0.55 percent in 2000. The dividends paid by
Enron, therefore, hardly offered an attractive or even a reasonable
rate of return

•

Shareholders equity, which grew from $ 3,723 million to $ 11,470
million, saw an increase of 308 percent. This is closer to the
increase of 404 percent in the share prices, although there is a
sizable gap between the increase in share price and shareholders’
equity.

•

We cannot also overlook the two-for-one stock split made by
Enron in August 1999. The trend of increase in share prices
prompted the stock-split, which was obviously intended to sustain

The pattern of changes in the minimum trading prices during the period was erratic.
From 35 dollars in 1996, it fell to 29 dollars in 1999 but recovered to 42 dollars in 2000.
But the trend with peak prices was consistent increase. They are more relevant for our
analysis here because Enron was, at that time, considered a good investment opportunity,
and its shares were a popular choice for investment.
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the trend. The effort was successful as the peak price, adjusted for
the split, more than doubled in the next year..
It is difficult to justify the market valuations of Enron shares by the
conventional standards, such as return on investment and underlying
value. But then, Efficient Markets Hypothesis is not merely a numbercrunching exercise with the financial data of past periods. Efficient
market theorists emphasize that the share prices reflect not only the
information “on events that have already occurred,” but also “events,
which, as of now, the market expects to take place in the future.”32 The
forecasts presented by Enron were generally positive, and the company
presented a picture of continuous growth. The following extracts from its
statutory annual reports are its official statements about the future. The
extracts are rather lengthy, but they are quite necessary for our analysis.
1. FORECASTS FOR 1997

Enron provided forecasts for six groups of activities in 199733
Transportation and Operation
The transportation and operation segment should continue to
provide stable earnings and cash flows during 1997. Various
expansion projects underway or proposed by the Enron Gas
Pipeline Group should enhance future earnings when completed.
Domestic Gas and Power Services
During 1997, ECT anticipates continued growth in the cash and
physical business over the 1996 results. The existence of its
substantial portfolio of contracts as well as the ability to benefit
from the relationships between the financial and physical markets
and the natural gas and electricity markets provide substantial
opportunities for earnings. Continued seasonal volatility of natural
32
33

Eugene Fama, Note 25, above.

Enron Corp. Form 10-K for fiscal year 1996. Item 7, Management’s Discussion and
Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations, at p. 39-50, available online:
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/72859/0000072859-97-000009.txt, May 2007.

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

16

[VOL. 04 NO. 01

gas prices will provide additional opportunities for increased
earnings.
Risk Management
[Enron] expects earnings from risk management to increase in
1997 as compared to 1996 as it continues to pursue opportunities in
the European marketplace and continues to increase integration of
financial products and its energy commodity portfolio, resulting in
highly structured transactions.
Finance
In 1997, E[nron] will continue to expand its products and services
in its role as a full-service provider of various types of capital. In
addition, earnings are expected from equity-based investments
which are carried by JEDI at fair value and are therefore subject to
market fluctuations.
International Operations and Development
The objective of E[nron] I[nternational] is to develop, finance, own
and operate integrated energy projects in emerging markets
through the utilization of Enron's extensive portfolio of products
and services. Growth opportunities in the emerging international
markets are expected to result from the current and projected
demand for energy infrastructure and merchant, finance and risk
management services.
Exploration and Production
E[nron] O[il &] G[as Company] plans to continue to focus a
substantial portion of its development and certain exploration
expenditures in its major producing areas in North America.
However, EOG anticipates spending an increasing part of its
available funds in the further development of opportunities in
India, Venezuela and Trinidad. In addition, EOG will continue
limited exploratory expenditures in new areas outside of North
America.
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2. FORECASTS FOR 1998

Enron classified its activities during 1998 into four categories, and the
forecasts continued with their general tone of optimism and hope.34
Exploration and Production
E[nron] plans to continue its significant investments in
development and certain exploration expenditures in its major
producing areas in North America. In addition, E[nron] anticipates
increased spending for the continued development of its significant
international projects in India, Venezuela, Trinidad and China.
Enron has hedged its net exposure to E[nron]'s natural gas prices
for 1998 production and will continue to assess opportunities for
hedging future production.
Transportation and Distribution
Transportation and Distribution should continue to provide stable
earnings and cash flows during 1998, including steady growth over
1997 levels.
Wholesale Energy Operations and Services
Enron anticipates continued growth in Wholesale during 1998.
Asset development and construction earnings are expected to
increase as a result of Enron's extensive portfolio of projects in
various stages of development. In the cash and physical business,
volumes are expected to continue to increase. In addition, the
existence of a substantial portfolio of contracts as well as the
ability to benefit from the relationships between the financial and
physical markets and the natural gas and electricity markets
provide substantial opportunities for earnings. Earnings from risk
management are expected to increase as Enron continues to pursue
opportunities in the European marketplace and continues to
34

Enron Corp. Form 10-K for fiscal year 1997. Item 7, Management’s Discussion and
Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations, at p. 38-55, available online:
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1024401/0001024401-98-000009.txt, May 2007.

18

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 04 NO. 01

increase integration of financial products and its energy
commodity portfolio worldwide. In the finance and investing
business, Enron will continue to expand its products and services
in its role as a full-service provider of various types of capital.
Further expansion into new products and international markets is
expected to increase results in all of these businesses.
Retail Energy Services
During 1998, E[nron] E[nergy] S[ervices] will continue its focus
on commercial and light industrial customers in the energy market,
while developing new energy products and expanding its customer
base. EES also plans to continue its efforts to improve the
regulatory environment for retail gas and electricity, both on state
and federal levels,35 strengthen its marketing and sales organization
and continue to enhance its transaction support capabilities.
E[nron] E[nergy] S[ervices] expects that 1998 losses will
approximate those incurred in 1997.
Enron tempered its projections for 1998 with a note of caution on
“Financial Risk Management,” and quantified the risk at $ 39 million.
3. FORECASTS FOR 1999

For 1999, Enron made its business projections under of four categories,36
and among these, it was rather neutral, if not pessimistic, about the
prospects of one – Exploration and Production. Forecasts for the other
three lines of business were optimistic in their usual bland style.

35

The reference to the “efforts to improve the regulatory environment” is significant, as it
indicates the political lobbying undertaken by Enron, and the inevitable corruption that
accompanies such efforts.
36

Enron Corp. Form 10-K for fiscal year 1998. Item 7, Management’s Discussion and
Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations, at p. 38-58, available online:
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1024401/0001024401-99-000007.txt, May 2007.
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Exploration and Production
EOG plans to continue to focus a substantial portion of its
development and exploration expenditures in its major producing
areas in North America. In addition, EOG anticipates additional
spending for the continued development of its projects in India,
Trinidad and China.
In December 1998, Enron received an unsolicited indication of
interest from a third party with respect to exploring a possible
transaction pursuant to which the third party would acquire Enron's
shares of EOG common stock and offer to acquire the remaining
shares of outstanding EOG common stock. There can be no
assurance that any such transaction will be consummated.
This cautious statement marks a departure from the usual tone of optimism
and hope, and is uncharacteristic of Enron.
Transportation and Distribution
Transportation and Distribution should continue to provide stable
earnings and cash flows during 1999, including steady growth over
1998 levels.
Wholesale Energy Operations and Services
Enron anticipates continued growth in Enron Wholesale during
1999 due to further expansion into new products and markets. In
the commodity sales and services business, volumes are expected
to continue to increase as Enron maintains or increases its market
share in the growing unregulated U.S. power market and the
European gas and power markets. In addition, Enron expects to
benefit from opportunities related to its substantial portfolio of
commodity contracts. Enron also expects to continue increased
integration of financial products with its energy commodity
portfolio. In the energy assets and investments business, Enron
will continue to benefit from opportunities related to its energy
investments, including sales or restructurings of appreciated
investments, and in providing capital to energy-intensive
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customers. Equity earnings from operations are expected to
increase as a result of commencement of commercial operations of
new power plants and pipeline in early 1999 including the larger
power project in India.
Retail Energy Services
During 1999, Enron anticipates continued growth in the demand
for energy outsourcing solutions. Energy Services will focus on
delivering these services to its existing customers, while continuing
to expand its commercial and industrial customer base for total
energy outsourcing. Energy Services also plans to continue
integrating its service delivery capabilities, focusing on the
development of best practices, nation-wide procurement
opportunities, efficient use of capital and centralized decision
making. Energy Services expects reduced losses in 1999.
Market Risk
The use of financial instruments by Enron's businesses may expose
Enron to market and credit risks resulting from adverse changes in
commodity and equity prices, interest rates and foreign exchange
rates.
The theme of risk was present again in the forecasts for 1999. After
making the brief initial statement, extracted above, Enron classified
market risks into four categories – commodity price, interest rate, foreign
currency exchange rate, and equity – and described them at some length.
But it did not quantify the value of the risks.

2008]

STOCK MARKETS, CORPORATIONS & THEIR REGULATION

21

4. FORECASTS FOR 2000

The number of business categories was five for 2000, but Enron presented
forecasts only for four of them, all uniformly sunny.37 For the fifth line of
business, Exploration and Production, about which Enron had been
cautious in the earlier year, it made no forecasts.
Transportation and Distribution
The Gas Pipeline Group should continue to provide stable earnings
and cash flows during 2000, including steady growth over 1999
levels. Low operating costs, competitive rates and continued
expansion opportunities enable the Gas Pipeline Group to continue
to be a strong, efficient competitor in all markets.
Wholesale Energy Operations and Services
Enron Wholesale plans to continue to expand its networks in each
of its key energy markets, as well as the market for broadband
services.
Worldwide energy markets continue to grow as
governments implement deregulation or privatization plans. The
market for broadband services is expected to increase significantly
as demand increases for high bandwidth applications such as
video. Enron will continue to purchase or develop selected assets
to expand its networks, as well as grow its portfolio of contracts
providing access to third-party assets. The combination of
growing markets and Enron Wholesale's highly developed marketmaking skills should continue to enhance market opportunities
globally for Enron over the next several years.
As a result, Enron anticipates continued growth in Enron
Wholesale during 2000. In the commodity sales and services
37

Enron Corp. Form 10-K for fiscal year 1999. Item 7, Management’s Discussion and
Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations, at p. 29-41, available online:
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1024401/0001024401-00-000002.txt, May 2007.
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business, volumes are expected to continue to increase as Enron
Wholesale increases its transaction volume in the growing
unregulated U.S. power market and in the rapidly expanding
European gas and power markets. In addition, EnronOnline is
expected to significantly add to transaction volume and profit
opportunities in the coming year. In the assets and investments
business, Enron Wholesale expects to continue to benefit from
opportunities related to its assets and investments, including sales
or restructurings of appreciated investments, and in providing
capital to energy-intensive customers. Equity earnings from
operations are expected to increase as a result of commencement of
commercial operations of new power plants and pipeline projects
in early 2000.
Retail Energy Services
During 2000, Energy Services anticipates continued growth in the
demand for retail energy outsourcing solutions, both domestically
and internationally. Energy Services will deliver these services to
its existing customers, while continuing to expand its commercial
and industrial customer base for total energy outsourcing. Energy
Services also plans to continue integrating its service delivery
capabilities, focusing on the development of best practices,
nationwide procurement opportunities and efficient use of capital.
5. FORECASTS FOR 2001

The final set of forecasts made by Enron was for 2001, the last year before
it filed for bankruptcy.38 Enron presented forecasts for four lines of
business, but there was a new entrant – broadband. In starting this new
line of business, Enron was quite obviously inspired by the Internet boom
in the stock market, and we discuss the issue in detail in Section [b],
below. Let us now take a look at the business forecasts made by Enron for
2001.
38

Enron Corp. Form 10-K for fiscal year 2000. Item 7, Management’s Discussion and
Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations, at p. 28-43, available online:
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1024401/000102440101500010/000102440101-500010.txt, May 2007.
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Transportation and Distribution
Enron Transportation Services is expected to provide stable
earnings and cash flows during 2001. The four major natural gas
pipelines have strong competitive positions in their respective
markets as a result of efficient operating practices, competitive
rates and favorable market conditions. Enron Transportation
Services expects to continue to pursue demand-driven expansion
opportunities.
Wholesale Services
In 2001, Wholesale Services plans to continue to fine-tune its
already successful existing energy networks. In North America,
Enron expects to complete the sale of five of its peaking power
plants located in the Midwest and its intrastate natural gas pipeline.
In each case, market conditions, such as increased liquidity, have
diminished the need to own physical assets. For energy networks
in other geographical areas where liquidity may be an issue, Enron
will evaluate whether its existing network will benefit from
additional physical assets. The existing networks in North
America and Europe should continue to provide opportunities for
sustained volume growth and increased profits.
The combination of knowledge gained in building networks in key
energy markets and the application of new technology, such as
EnronOnline, is expected to provide the basis to extend Wholesale
Services' business model to new markets and industries. In key
international markets, where deregulation is underway, Enron
plans to build energy networks by using the optimum combination
of acquiring or constructing physical assets and securing
contractual access to third party assets. Enron also plans to
replicate its business model to new industrial markets such as
metals, pulp, paper and lumber, coal and steel. Enron expects to
use its Ecommerce platform, EnronOnline, to accelerate the
penetration into these industries.

24

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 04 NO. 01

Retail Energy Services
During 2001, Energy Services anticipates continued growth in the
demand for retail energy outsourcing solutions. Energy Services
will deliver these services to its existing customers, while
continuing to expand its commercial and industrial customer base
for total energy outsourcing. Energy Services also plans to
continue integrating its service delivery capabilities, extend its
business model to related markets and offer new products.
Broadband Services
Broadband Services is extending Enron's proven business model to
the communications industry. In 2001, Enron expects to further
develop the Enron Intelligent Network, a global broadband
network with broad connectivity potential to both buyers and
sellers of bandwidth through Enron's pooling points. In addition,
Enron expects to further deploy its proprietary Broadband
Operating System across the Enron Intelligent Network, enabling
Enron to manage bandwidth capacity independent of owning the
underlying fiber. Broadband Services expects its intermediation
transaction level to increase significantly in 2001 as more market
participants connect to the pooling points and transact with Enron
to manage their bandwidth needs. The availability of Enron's
bandwidth intermediation products and prices on EnronOnline are
expected to favorably impact the volume of transactions. In 2001,
Broadband Services expects to continue to expand the commercial
roll-out of its content service offerings including video-on-demand.
Enron expects the volume of content delivered over its network to
increase as more content delivery contracts are signed and as more
distribution partner locations are connected.
The annual report in Form 10-K for 2000 also had a lengthy discussion on
risk factors, but again it did not quantify the value of the risks anticipated
for 2001.
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In general, the forecasts made by Enron for the five years 1997-2001 were
characterized by a sense of optimism and hope. They gave little cause for
concern. Applying the broad principles of the informational regime and
Efficient Markets Hypothesis, the action of the stock market in giving
progressively higher valuations to the shares of Enron during this period
cannot be faulted. But the question raised here is with respect to the
proportionality of increase or the sense of balance in market reaction,
rather than the nature of the reaction or the quantum of increases.39
As we noted earlier, the increase in peak share prices, at 404 percent, was
out of proportion to the growth in earnings (57 percent), and the growth in
shareholders’ equity (308 percent). Also, the market appears to have
almost completely ignored the cautions on risks sounded by Enron in its
statutory filings. These raise questions about the seriousness with which
the stock market treats the statutory filings whose stated purpose is to
guide the market. The tone and spirit of the statements in the statutory
filings, extracted above, were sober and sedate. There were no attempts to
sensationalizing, nor was eloquence applied to paint a very rosy picture for
the company.
The case was, however, quite different with the press releases issued by
Enron during 1997-2001, particularly the ones issued in 2001 before the
company filed for bankruptcy. The press releases used more direct and
aggressive language in projecting the company. They were, quite
obviously, intended to feed the stock market with stories of never-ending
success and profits, and drive the price of Enron shares upwards.
The following are some prominent examples of the variety of information
Enron released to the media.40

39

It is not possible to attribute the increases in the price of Enron shares to the “Internet
boom,” which gripped the stock market in the late 1990s. Enron had little to do with the
Internet, at least until 1999 when the company ventured into “broadband networks,” as
we will see a little later.

40

The complete list and texts of the press releases issued by Enron Corp. in 2001 are
available online: http://www.enron.com/corp/pressroom/releases/2001/, May 2007.
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“Enron Announces Increased Earnings Target for 2001,” January
25, 2001.
“Enron Reports Record First Quarter Earnings of $ 0.47 per
Diluted Share; Increases Earnings Expectations for 2001,” April
17, 2001.
“Enron Reiterates Confidence in Operations and Earnings
Outlook,” June 19, 2001.

These releases related to the profits and earnings of Enron’s business.
Alongside, Enron issued a number of press releases that regularly extolled
the other accomplishments of the company. They had headlines like
“Enron Named Most Innovative for Sixth Year” (June 2, 2001).41 The
runaway increases in the price of Enron shares can be traced more to the
tone and contents of the press releases and media reports, rather than the
sober and balanced language of the statutory filings.
The question here is which source of information received greater weight
in the stock market? Was it the press releases and media reports, or the
statutory filings? If the actual events in the market are inspired by
corporate press releases, rather than the contents of statutory filings, then
which of them is the source of the “information” stressed by the Efficient
Markets Hypothesis? What is the actual significance of the elaborate
informational regime? These questions are again articulated in the
concluding section of the paper.

B. ACCOUNTING RESTATEMENTS BY ENRON
In October 2001, Enron restated its financial data for the years 1997 to
2000. This triggered a panic in the stock market, which led to a collapse
in the price of its shares, and finally the company itself. The following is a
summary of the accounting revisions announced by Enron.42

41
42

Ibid.

Data taken from the Report of Special Investigative Committee of the Board of
Directors of Enron Corp. (William C. Powers Committee), February 1, 2002, available
online: www.news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/enron/specinv020102rpt1.pdf, May 2007
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Table 2
Enron Corp.
Impact of Accounting Restatements Announced in October 2001
(All figures in $ million)
Year

Earnings
Original

Earnings
Revised

1997
1998
1999
2000
Net
Change

88
686
827
896

60
553
579
779
- 526

Shareholders’
Equity
Original
5,618
7,048
9,570
11,470

Shareholders’
Equity
Revised
5,360
6,657
8,860
10,716

The revised information was, admittedly, not available to the market at the
time when the prices were determined in the market in the above years,
and they are not relevant for our assessment of the informational
efficiency of the market with respect to the contemporary prices set in the
market. But the revised data are relevant for what happened in the market
after the revision.
According to the doctrine of the informational regime and the Efficient
Markets Hypothesis, the market must have adjusted the prices of Enron
shares in line with the revised data. The total revision in earnings was to
the tune of 21 percent, and in the case of shareholders’ equity, the revision
was less than 7 percent. Going by the Efficient Markets Hypothesis,
revision in the price of Enron shares must have been in the neighbourhood
of these percentages. But it was not so. The market overreacted to the
revisions, just as it had earlier overreacted to positive news from the
company, and slaughtered Enron shares.
The reaction of the stock market to information was excessive on both
occasions, earlier when Enron projected a very rosy future, and later when
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it revised its earnings figures. The company did, after all, have its
business and assets. The liquidity problems which led to the bankruptcy
filing in 2001 were a passing phase, and there were no grounds to believe
that the case was hopeless. The business of the company – namely, selling
energy, was fundamentally sound. That the market perception about the
value of Enron was wrong is proved by the fact that it has made
disbursements of over $ 11 billion since the bankruptcy filing until March
2007.43

C. ENRON, BROADBAND NETWORKS AND BUSINESS
ADVENTURISM
In 1999 at the height of the frenzy in the stock market in the shares of
Internet companies, Enron ventured into broadband business. Those were
also the heady days of growth at Enron, and starting new ventures was the
order of the day. Enron, an energy company with 70 years’ standing, was
apparently mesmerized by the spell of Internet technology, and decided to
take the plunge.44 The following is an account of how Enron went about
its broadband network venture.
Under American corporate law, as it developed in early twentieth century,
corporate managements have complete freedom to take up any business
activity. There are neither legal restrictions on their powers, nor even
procedural safeguards.45 It would be obvious from the following
discussion that Enron jumped into the broadband venture investing
hundreds of millions of dollars, without serious planning. The actions of
43

Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. (formerly Enron Corp.) Press Release “Enron
Distributes Approximately $ 1.9 Billion to Creditors” 2 April 2007, available online:
http://www.enron.com/corp/pressroom/, May 2007.

44

For an entertaining account of the Net Frenzy in the stock market in the 1990s, see
William Bonner & Addison Wiggin, The Financial Reckoning Day: Surviving the Soft
Depression of the 21st Century (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2003).

45

For an account of the position that existed earlier in the nineteenth century when the
business activities of corporations were subject to regulation, and the gradual changes
that occurred, see Morton J. Horwitz, “Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of
Corporate Theory” (1985) 88 W. Va. L. Rev. 173.
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Enron described here raise questions about the decision-making process in
large public corporations, the level of responsibility that informs the
process, and accountability of corporate actors for their decisions.
The following table has the comparative data with respect to “capital
expenditures and equity investments” of Enron for 1999. Plans of capital
expenditure were given in the annual report in Form 10-K for 1998 filed in
1999, and the actual expenditures were given in the annual report for 1999
filed in 2000.
Table 3
Enron Corp.
Capital Expenditures and Equity Investments
(Figures in $ Million)
Description
Transportation
and Distribution
Wholesale
Energy
Operations and
Services
Retail Energy
Services
Exploration and
Production
Corporate and
Other
Total

Estimates

Difference

550

Actual
Expenditure
316

310

1,216

+906

410

64

-346

40

226

+186

300

541

+241

1,610

2,363

+753

-234

It can be seen from the above table that there is no reference to any
expenditure on broadband networks either in the plan figures reported in
1998 or in the actual expenditure reported in 1999. In particular, the
absence of any reference in the estimates given as a part of the 1998 report
indicates that Enron did not have any plans to venture into this new line of
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business. On closer scrutiny, we find that the new line of business,
broadband network, is tucked away under “wholesale energy operations
and services.” The capital expenditure under this head ($ 1,216 million)
was about four times the estimate ($ 310 million), but there is no
explanation for the overrun. In particular, there is no information on the
expenditure incurred on the broadband network. Given the size of the
overrun and the fact that a new venture – broadband network – was taken
up during the year, it is reasonable to assume that the expenditure on the
new venture was to the tune of several hundreds of millions of dollars.
Against this background, disclosures made in the annual report for fiscal
year 1999, the year in which the investment was actually made, are
revealing.46
•

In the discussion of “Business” in Part 1 of the report, there is a
rather abrupt reference to “communication assets including
broadband services,” and they are included in “Wholesale Energy
Operations and Services.” No efforts are made to introduce the
fact that the company had entered the broadband business.47

•

The next reference to “broadband services business” has the prefix
“new,” and this is the only indication that it represents a new line
of business for the company.48

•

The report then has six paragraphs which generally extol the
advantages of the “Enron Intelligent Network ("EIN"), a high
capacity, global fiber optic network with a distributed server
architecture, to provide services to the broadband market.”49

•

The lengthy discussion makes no efforts to identify how and by
whom the decision to enter the broadband business was taken, nor
does it disclose the amount of investment.

46

Note 37, above.

47

Ibid. at p. 1.

48

Ibid. at p. 5.

49

Ibid. at p. 11.
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•

The only references to the individuals involved in the new
broadband venture are in the designations of Joseph M. Hirko, who
is described as the “CEO of Enron Broadband Services,” and
Kenneth D. Rice, who is also described as “CEO of Enron
Broadband Services.”50

•

In the discussion of “Outlook” for 2000, as we have noted above,
the report was quite eloquent about the potential of the broadband
business.51

From the above, we can reasonably conclude that (a) the broadband
network business was started rather suddenly in 1999, and (b) its cost ran
into many hundreds of millions of dollars. The company folded up in the
next two years, and the fate of the broadband network is not known. The
variety of reporting done by Enron is also significant. It did not disclose
the expenditure incurred by it on the new venture, the broadband network,
nor did it discuss the venture in an intelligible manner.
The wide variance between the capital expenditure plans for 1999
disclosed in annual report for 1998 filed at the beginning of 1999 and the
actual expenditure reported for 1999 indicate that Enron management had
little respect for its own estimates. It casually overshot the estimates, and
the total overrun was more than $ 750 million. Neither corporate law, nor
the informational regime has anything to say on such conduct. On the
contrary, the defense of business judgment accepted by the courts would
prevent them from examining such managerial decisions and actions, if
they were to be questioned in court.52
In terms of corporate accountability, the fact that Enron management
could rush into such decisions and expend very large sums of (other
peoples’) money is a commentary on the way public corporations are
50

Ibid. at p. 20-21.

51

P. 18, above.

52

For a general critique of the business judgment rule, see Lawrence E. Mitchell,
Corporate Irresponsibility: America’s Newest Export (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale
University Press, 2001).

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

32

[VOL. 04 NO. 01

presently organized under the law. The cursory discussion made by Enron
management with respect to the new business, ex post, is an indication of
the efficacy of the informational regime. The company did not have to
disclose the amount of money invested in the new business, the
considerations which went into the decision or the identity of the
individuals involved in the decision. The barebones disclosures actually
made by Enron are sufficient compliance with regulation, but they are
virtually useless in terms of promoting corporate responsibility or
accountability.
The broadband venture of Enron was more in the spirit of Adam Smith’s
“speculative merchant” who
[e]xercises no one regular, established, or well-known branch of
business. He is a corn merchant this year, or tea merchant the year
after. He enters into every trade when he foresees that it is likely
to be more than commonly profitable . . .53
The criticisms leveled above can be countered with the argument, what if
the broadband network investment had paid off? The question smacks of
a gambling and speculative approach to business managed by a few for the
benefit of many, and reinforces the earlier criticism about weak corporate
responsibility and accountability. The amount of money in question was
very large, and was not that of the persons who handled it. The decisions
made by this handful of individuals would have serious consequences for
many others, and it is imperative that a sense of responsibility informs the
conduct of the persons in such positions of power. The freedom that
business corporations are given in law, exemplified by consequences such
as the broadband business venture of Enron, must also be examined from
these perspectives.
Enron’s annual report for the next year (2000)54 is eloquent about the
business advantages which Enron expected to derive from the broadband
53

Adam Smith, An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Book 1,
Chapter 10, Part 1. Available online: http://geolib.com/smith.adam/won1-10.html, June
2007.

54

Note 38, above.
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business. However, it actually lost $ 60 million in 2000 from the
broadband business. According to the annual report for 2000, Enron
expected to incur further capital expenditure of $ 436 million on its
broadband network in 2000, and another $ 700 million in 2001.
The argument here is that the high valuations offered by the stock market
for the shares of technology companies in the late 1990s was the incentive
for Enron to venture into broadband business, and the above is a brief tale
of how it went about the venture. It is not that business enterprises must
have no flexibility, but it is important that we combine it with adequate
safeguards which would guide managements towards responsible
decision-making, and promote accountability.

D. ENRON MANAGEMENT AND ITS INCENTIVES FOR
PERFORMANCE
The managerial style at Enron became increasingly stock market-centric in
the final years, and this is exemplified by the performance incentives
offered to its senior management. Here, we examine the employment
contracts of its CEO, Kenneth Lay, and his last two contracts with the
company explain how stock market considerations emerged as the sole
concern at Enron in its last years.. The incentives offered to Kenneth Lay
were primarily geared towards achieving increases in share prices;
improving business performance was only secondary.
Kenneth Lay had an employment agreement dated September 1, 1989 and
there was a fifth amendment to the agreement in February 1994.55 By this
amendment, Kenneth Lay had the option to acquire 1.2 million shares of
Enron at the then prevailing market price of $ 34. The right to exercise the
options was linked to Enron achieving 15 percent compounded growth in
earnings per share in 1994, 1995 and 1996. This can be traced to the wellknown tendency of the stock market to give higher valuations to the shares

55

Text of the amendment is a part of the annual report of Enron in Form 10-K for 1993,
available
online:
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/72859/0000072859-94000005.txt, June 2007.
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of companies that show growth in earnings. This tendency of the stock
market is well-known.56
Faced with growth targets for earnings, Kenneth Lay was able to achieve
growth right on target, as evident from the table below.
Table 4
Enron Corp.
Earnings per Share Targets and Actual – 1994-96
Year
1994
1995
1996

Earnings Per Share
Target
1.783
2.050
2.357

Actual Earnings Per
Share
1.80
2.07
2.31

The accuracy with which Enron achieved the growth in earnings per share
is remarkable. It raises questions about the quality of the financial
statements of Enron for the relevant years (1994, 1995 and 1996), given its
record of financial misstatements and restatements. The fatal restatements
announced by Enron in 2001 were with respect to 1997, 1998, 1999 and
2000, but the closeness of the reported earnings for the earlier years with
the respective targets is suspicious.
In the Roaring Nineties,57 the use of stock options, and share price
increases triggered by reported increases in earnings were both
widespread. The annual growth rate target of 15 percent determined by
Enron was neither accidental, nor uncommon. It was apparently the norm
of the times. Edward Chancellor explained:

56

The Conglomerate Boom of the 1960s, in which companies went on a spree of
acquiring other companies with higher earnings, was an early symptom of this trend. See
George Soros, The Alchemy of Finance: Reading the Mind of the Market (New York:
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1987).

57

The phrase has been used by Joseph Stiglitz, note 26, above.
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Equity-linked bonus schemes provide a clear incentive for
managements to fix the numbers. During the bubble period, the
market tended to reward companies which managed to supply
annual per-share earnings growth of 15% - a magic number
chosen, it would seem, because it implied profits would double
over five years. In the real world, in a period of low inflation, this
was an absurd target. Nevertheless, it became commonplace.
Earnings-growth targets were achieved through a number of ways.
First, it became common to report to investors unofficial and
unaudited earnings figures – known as “pro forma” – which
ignored certain costs such as depreciation charges. Second, growth
in earnings per share was frequently boosted by taking on debt to
repurchase shares. Third, some companies looked to reduce
normal business expenses, such as investment in research and
development or marketing, in order to create the illusion of
sustainable earnings growth. Fourthly, many companies – such as
the conglomerates General Electric and Tryco – bolstered their
earnings by acquiring other companies, whose share were less
highly-valued.58
The saving grace with the 1994 amendment to the employment contract of
Kenneth Lay was that it at least linked improving the business
performance and earnings of the company to the incentive offered to Lay.
It was not directly concerned with managing share prices in the stock
market. But these pretenses were dropped in the next employment
contract of Lay, signed in December 1996.59
Under the 1996 agreement, Kenneth Lay could get 637,500 shares of
Enron on the condition that the price of Enron shares outperformed the
Standard and Poor Composite Index. This was to be the new yardstick for
measuring the performance of Kenneth Lay. The focus is entirely on share
prices, and other considerations are irrelevant. Everything is subordinated

58
59

Edward Chancellor, “Sold Out” The Guardian, 27 June 2002.

The agreement is Exhibit 10.25 to the annual report in Form 10-K filed by Enron for
fiscal
year
1996,
available
online:
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1024401/0000950129-97-001319.txt, June 2007.
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to the supreme goal of managing increases in share prices, and all
corporate actions must lead towards this goal.
The actions of Enron during the fateful years, 1997-2001, can be better
understood from the perspective of the incentives that were held out to its
management, exemplified by the employment contract of Kenneth Lay.
Excessive risk-taking, expensive efforts at influencing regulation through
political and administrative corruption, unduly optimistic press releases,
business losses and clumsy efforts to cover them up, all appear, in
retrospect, inevitable, almost pre-ordained. They were beckoning, and
Enron and Lay had to only grasp them.60

III. SYCAMORE NETWORKS
Sycamore Networks is a representative of the technology companies
which were started in large numbers during the Internet boom in the stock
market in the late 1990s. A theory was presented that the business value
of these companies was in their cutting edge technology, and the potential
for profits was huge, virtually limitless.61 By implication, conventional
standards like physical assets and earnings would have little relevance for
such companies.62 This was an important distinction because it eliminated
arguments that the high prices which the market gave to the shares of
Internet companies could not be justified with reference to conventional
standards. This was the milieu in which Sycamore Networks made its
entry.

60

The end of Kenneth Lay, the son of a poor preacher, was fittingly melodramatic. The
trial court convicted him in May 2006 of various crimes, and he faced a long prison
sentence. But Lay died in less than two months, in July 2006 before his sentence was
determined. Significantly, the conviction of Kenneth Lay was vacated after his death,
which means that his family would not be deprived of most of the wealth acquired by
Lay.

61

For an entertaining and irreverent account of the exaggerations made about technology
companies during the period, see William Bonner and Addison Wiggin, note 44, above.

62

For a discussion on such arguments, see Geoffrey Moore, “When private goes public”
Forbes, 10 April 1999.
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Sycamore Networks was incorporated in 1998, and quickly made two
public issues – one in August 1999 and another in March 2000.
Admittedly for neither of the two issues did it have any business needs for
which it required capital. The Delaware corporate statute places no
restrictions on the right of corporations to issue their shares.63 It is not
necessary that companies must have business need, or other legitimate
reasons before they can issue their shares to the public. They are free to
offer their shares to the public, and the only consideration is that there are
willing buyers for the shares offered.
Neither does securities law require that companies must have business
needs or other legitimate reasons for public issues.64 It is sufficient for the
purpose of securities law if a company making a public issue discloses its
plans on how it would use the proceeds of the issue, or alternatively, state
that it has no plans!
Neither corporate law nor securities law seek to regulate issues of shares
by companies to the public.65 The matter is left to the all-wise market,
which is considered to be sufficiently capable of handling such questions.
There is no role for public policy, represented by the law, to intervene in
such matters. Sycamore Networks is a case-in-example of the possibilities
in this loose regulatory framework.
As we noted earlier, Sycamore Networks was incorporated in February
1998, at the height of the Internet boom in the stock market. It made two
public issues, one in August 1999 and the other, a “follow-up” issue, in
February 2000. Both the public issues were made during the boom period,
and the company and its management took full advantage of the prevailing
sentiment in favour of technology companies. The company collected
over $ 1.5 billion from the two public issues, while insiders collected over
$ 260 million from sale of the shares held by them. We now examine how
the company marketed its issues, and how it was received by the investors.
63

Delaware General Corporation Law, Section 151.

64

On the contrary, they expressly permit companies having no specific need for capital,
termed “blank check companies” to make public issues. Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. 77a et seq. Section 3(b)(3) and Rule 419 (17 CFR Part 230).

65

The issue of public issues and their legitimacy is discussed a little later.
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A. SYCAMORE DISCLOSURES AND STOCK MARKET BEHAVIOUR
The rationale of the informational regime is that the disclosures made by
companies will put the investors on alert, and enable them to make
informed investment decisions.66 The law does not seek to directly protect
the investors, but merely requires companies to make disclosures. The
theory is that the investors, armed with knowledge, would be able to
assess the quality of public issues and protect themselves by making
appropriate investment decisions.
Among the disclosures which
companies must make with respect to their public issues, “risk factors” are
an important part. Information about the risk factors is supposed to put the
investors on guard, and help them to decide about their choice of
investments.
The other side of the informational regime is that once a company has
made the necessary disclosures, it cannot be held responsible for the
outcome of the investment decisions made by investors. The reasoning is
that if the investors have been alerted by the risk factors disclosed, and if
the risks materialize later on, the corporation which had already issued a
warning about the risk can hardly be held to task.
Sycamore Networks, as we have noted, is a company formed during a
particular tide in the stock market – the Internet boom – and it intended to
take advantage of it. The events in Sycamore are more intelligible when
viewed from this perspective. The first registration statement filed by
Sycamore Networks under the Securities Act of 1933 began with the
following caveat.67
You should rely only on the information contained in this
prospectus. We have not authorized anyone to provide you with
information different from that contained in this prospectus.
66
67

P.M. Vasudev, note 20, above, at p. 35.

Sycamore Networks, Registration Statement in Form S-1, August 6, 1999, at p. 3.
Available online: http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1092367/0000927016-99002819.txt, May 2007.
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The caveat is significant because the company, like Enron, was in the
practice of issuing frequent press releases, and it was also often written
about in the financial press. These reports generally projected the
company in a favourable light, and the caveat was meant to shield the
management against charges with respect to any information in the press
releases or media reports. The caveat was followed by a lengthy account
of the “Risk Factors,”68 and it is necessary to extract the leading risk
factors reported by the company, not despite but because of their length.
•

•
•
•
•
•

•

68

We Expect that Substantially All Of Our Revenues Will Be
Generated From A Limited Number Of Customers. We currently
have only one customer, Williams Communications. Williams is
not contractually committed to purchase any minimum quantities
of products from us.
Our Business Is Difficult To Evaluate Because We Have A
Limited Operating History.
Our Failure To Increase Our Revenues Would Prevent Us From
Achieving And Maintaining Profitability
We have incurred significant losses since inception and expect to
continue to incur losses in the future.
We Are Entirely Dependent On Our Line Of Intelligent Optical
Networking Products And Our Future Revenue Depends On Their
Commercial Success.
Our future growth depends on the commercial success of our line
of intelligent optical networking products. To date, our SN 6000
Intelligent Optical Transport product is the only product that has
been shipped to a customer.
We intend to develop and introduce new products and
enhancements to existing products in the future. We cannot assure
you that we will be successful in completing the development or
introduction of these products. Failure of our current or planned
products to operate as expected could delay or prevent their
adoption.

Ibid. at p. 6-16. The extracts here are mostly bare headings. For detailed warnings, see
the document itself.
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

69

[VOL. 04 NO. 01

Because Our Products Are Complex And Are Deployed In
Complex Environments, They May Have Errors Or Defects That
We Find Only After Full Deployment, Which Could Seriously
Harm Our Business.
The market for intelligent optical networking products is new. We
cannot be certain that a viable market for our products will develop
or be sustainable.
Our Business Will Suffer If We Do Not Respond Rapidly To
Technological Changes.
Our Business Will Suffer If Our Products Do Not Anticipate And
Meet Specific Customer Requirements.
We Face Intense Competition.69
Our Business Will Suffer If We Do Not Expand Our Sales
Organization And Our Customer Service And Support Operations.
We Depend Upon Contract Manufacturers And Any Disruption In
These Relationships May Cause Us To Fail To Meet The Demands
Of Our Customers And Damage Our Customer Relationships.
We Rely On Single Sources For Supply Of Certain Components
And Our Business May Be Seriously Harmed If Our Supply Of
Any Of These Components Is Disrupted.
The Unpredictability Of Our Quarterly Results May Adversely
Affect The Trading Price Of Our Common Stock.
You should not rely on our results or growth for one quarter as any
indication of our future performance.
Undetected Software Or Hardware Errors And Problems Arising
From Use Of Our Products In Conjunction With Other Vendors'
Products Could Have A Material Adverse Effect On Us.
Our Failure To Establish And Maintain Key Customer
Relationships May Result In Delays In Introducing New Products
Or Cause Customers To Forego Purchasing Our Products.
Our Business Will Suffer If We Fail To Properly Manage Our
Growth.
We Depend On Our Key Personnel To Manage Our Business
Effectively In A Rapidly Changing Market And If We Are Unable

This contradicted the earlier statement, at p. 2, about the significant innovative features
of the product of Sycamore Networks and its unique advantages.
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To Retain Our Key Employees, Our Ability To Compete Could Be
Harmed.
Our Business Will Be Adversely Affected If We Are Unable To
Protect Our Intellectual Property Rights From Third-Party
Challenges.
If Necessary Licenses Of Third-Party Technology Are Not
Available To Us Or Are Very Expensive Our Business Will Be
Seriously Harmed.
We Could Become Subject To Litigation Regarding Intellectual
Property Rights Which Could Seriously Harm Our Business.
We May Face Risks Associated With Our International Expansion
That Could Seriously Harm Our Financial Condition And Results
Of Operations.
We Face A Number Of Unknown Risks Associated With Year
2000 Problems.70
Any Acquisitions We Make Could Disrupt Our Business And
Seriously Harm Our Financial Condition.
Our Stock Price May Be Volatile.
Management May Apply The Proceeds Of This Offering To Uses
That Do Not Increase Our Profits Or Market Value.71
Insiders Will Continue To Have Substantial Control Over
Sycamore After This Offering And Could Limit Your Ability To
Influence The Outcome Of Key Transactions, Including Changes
of Control.
Provisions Of Our Charter Documents And Delaware Law May
Have Anti-Takeover Effects That Could Prevent A Change Of
Control.
Provisions of our amended and restated certificate of incorporation,
bylaws, and Delaware law could make it more difficult for a third
party to acquire us, even if doing so would be beneficial to our
stockholders.

70

This is a rather strange statement from a company that has hardly commenced
operations, and must be in a position to take effective steps to handle the perceived risks
from the Year 2000 phenomenon.

71

This comes perilously close to admission of criminal intentions on the part of the
management.
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There May Be Sales Of A Substantial Amount Of Our Common
Stock After This Offering That Could Cause Our Stock Price To
Fall.
Our current stockholders hold a substantial number of shares,
which they will be able to sell in the public market in the near
future. Sales of a substantial number of shares of our common
stock within a short period of time after this offering could cause
our stock price to fall. In addition, the sale of these shares could
impair our ability to raise capital through the sale of additional
stock.

These dire warnings left nothing to chance. The authors of the document
were, however, still not satisfied, and invoke the so-called “safe-harbour”
in the Securities Laws for further protection.72 They add:
We believe that it is important to communicate our future
expectations to our investors. However, there may be events in the
future that we are not able to accurately predict or control. The
factors listed above in the section captioned “Risk Factors,” as well
as any cautionary language in this prospectus, provide examples of
risks, uncertainties and events that may cause our actual results to
differ materially from the expectations we describe in our forwardlooking statements. Before you invest in our common stock, you
should be aware that the occurrence of the events described in
these risk factors and elsewhere in this prospectus could have a
material adverse effect on our business, results of operations and
financial position.73
Quite obviously, the registration statement has been prepared with a great
deal of care to ensure that the management of Sycamore would be
adequately protected if there were any allegations about the public issue
and the prospects of the company. This is a neat subversion of the
principle of disclosure which is the foundation of the informational
regime. The disclosures required in law are meant to inform the investors,
rather than to protect the persons who issue the securities. The case of
72

Securities Act, Section 27A.

73

Sycamore Networks, Registration Statement in Form S-1, note 67, above at p. 16.
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Sycamore is an illustration of how an apparently well-conceived
regulatory instrument can be abused.
Subsequently in the discussion on “Business,” later in the document,74
Sycamore Networks portrayed its product and business prospects in a
somewhat positive light, but was careful to add some references to the
uncertainty created by factors such as the “intensely competitive market”75
and the possibility of “claims [of] infringement with respect to our current
or future products.”76 This is yet another example of clever legal drafting.
A registration statement for securities, or to use the traditional term,
“prospectus,”77 cannot completely avoid any favourable description of the
business of the company which plans to issue the securities. At the same
time, the promoters would be at risk if the descriptions are very rosy and
optimistic. Therefore, clever efforts are made to blend optimism with
uncertainty.
1. PURPOSE OF FIRST PUBLIC ISSUE

After making dark predictions about the future, Sycamore explained the
purposes for which it planned to make the public issue.
The principal purposes of this offering are to establish a public
market for our common stock, to increase our visibility in the
marketplace, to facilitate future access to public capital markets, to
provide liquidity to existing stockholders and to obtain additional
working capital.
We expect to use the net proceeds for general corporate purposes,
including working capital and capital expenditures, and the
74

Ibid. at p. 25-34.

75

Ibid. at p. 33.

76

Ibid. at p. 34.

77

The older term “prospectus,” derived from the word “prospect,” was etymologically
more accurate. A statement issued in connection with the issue of securities would
describe the “prospects” of the project that was planned with the money to be raised from
the issue. The current term “registration statement” is largely neutral in its import, and
can be interpreted as a sign of a more “hands-off” approach in securities regulations.
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repayment of outstanding amounts under our equipment lines of
credit. . .
Although we may use a portion of the net proceeds to acquire
businesses, products or technologies that are complementary to our
business, we have no specific acquisitions planned. Pending such
uses, we plan to invest the net proceeds in investment grade,
interest-bearing securities.78
The public issue of shares was, quite obviously, treated an end itself,
rather than as means to the end of raising capital for substantive business
activities.79 The securities law makes no efforts to check this variety of
public issues made for no clear business purpose.80 In any case, Sycamore
Networks was candid that a purpose of the public issue was to “provide
liquidity to existing stockholders.” This takes us to the question of the
track record of the “existing stockholders” and what they brought to the
table at the time of the public issue, in terms of the business fundamentals
of the company. Sycamore Networks presented the following financial
data for the period until May 1999, prior to its first public issue in August
1999.
Table 5
Sycamore Networks
Financial Data as on May 31, 1999
78

Sycamore Networks Registration Statement, note 67, above at p. 17.

79

This neatly ties in with the portrayal of companies by Frank Easterbrook and Daniel
Fischel (note 7, above at p. 1419-1420) as the sellers of securities, rather than entities
raising capital for doing business. In the imagery of Easterbrook and Fischel, the
business of companies is selling securities. The problem with this approach is not that it
lacks truth, but it presents the situation as the ideal, a sort of perfect culmination of a
process of rational development.

80

This raises the larger question of a theory for the stock market, in terms of defining the
role that we expect the institution to play in the socio-economy. Historically, the role of
the stock market has varied from providing capital for legitimate business purposes at one
end, to being a veritable gambling den at the other. The prevailing notions about the
stock market affirm the need for a more comprehensive theory of the market, which is
explored in the concluding part of this paper.

2008]

STOCK MARKETS, CORPORATIONS & THEIR REGULATION

Description
Operating revenue
Operating Expenses
Accumulated operating loss
Shareholders’ equity

45

Amount ( $ ‘000s)
-11,384
(11,384)
(10,113)

The company had no sales, and accumulated operating loss was over $ 11
million. The investors, for their part, were hardly deterred; neither the
gloomy predictions made by the company, nor the absence of a welldefined business purpose for the issue, nor even the poor financial record
of the company made the slightest difference. Sycamore’s first public
issue was completed in October 1999, and it was a resounding success.
The company issued 7,475,000 common shares with a par value of $ 0.001
at a price of $ 38 per share.81 The gross proceeds from the issue were $
284.5 million. After deducting the expenses of about 21 million dollars
incurred towards issue expenses, the company was left with 263 million
dollars from the first public issue.
On listing, Sycamore shares were received in the stock market with even
greater enthusiasm, and were actively traded in the months that followed.
The price reached $ 105 by the end of January 2000. The company did
not lose the opportunity presented by the enthusiasm of the market for its
shares, and opened a “follow-up public offering” in February 2000.82 It
completed the second issue in March 2000, at a price of $ 150.25 per
share. This time around, however, there was a difference. Of the total of
10.2 million shares offloaded to the public, about 8.43 million were issued
by the company, and the remaining 1.77 million shares were sold
personally by the existing holders, who were the management team and its

81

Sycamore Networks, report for the quarter ended October 31, 1999 in Form 10-Q, at p.
8. Available online: http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1092367/0000927016-99003928.txt, May 2007.

82

Sycamore Networks, report for the quarter ended March 31, 2000 in Form 10-Q, at p.
8.
Available
online:
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1092367/000092701600002132/000092701600-002132.txt, May 2007.
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associates.83 The details of the two public issues of Sycamore Networks
are summarized in the table below.
Table 6
Sycamore Networks
Public Issues of Shares 1999-2000
Description

Issue Price
Number of shares
issued by the company
Number of shares sold
by management and
associates
Gross Proceeds for the
company
Gross Proceeds for the
management and
associates
Expenses of the Issue

First Issue
(August-October
1999)
$ 38
7,475,000*

Second Issue
(February-March 2000)

-

1,771,599

$ 284,050,000

$ 1,266,367,250

-

$ 266,182,750

$ 21 million approx.

$ 66 million approx.

$ 150.25
8,428,401

* The company effected a three-for-one stock split in February 2000,84
before the second public issue, and consequently, the number of shares
swelled to 22,425,000.

2. SYCAMORE REPORTS AND SHARE PRICES
To recapitulate, the theory of the informational regime and the Efficient
Markets Hypothesis is that the stock market will apply the information
provided by the companies and determine share prices which reasonably
83

Ibid.

84

Ibid. at p. 22.
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reflect the “intrinsic value” of the shares. As we have seen, Sycamore, a
loss-making company, issued its shares at $ 38 in October 1999, and the
price rose to $ 105 dollars by January 2000. The second public issue made
during March 2000 was at $ 150 per share.
We have also seen that the issue price of 38 dollars per share, determined
by the market in October 1999, could not be justified with reference to its
business fundamentals, such as assets or earnings. The dismal financial
record of Sycamore and even more, the dark predictions it made about its
future left little hope. But the market ignored the information, and offered
a price of $ 38 per share in October 1999.
Let us now consider the events in the market over the next few months
when the price of Sycamore shares reached $ 105 by January 2000, and
for the second public issue made in February 2000, the market determined
a price of $ 150 per share. Following are the data for the six months ended
January 2000, taken from the registration statement filed by Sycamore on
February 17, 2002 before its second public issue.85
Table 7
Sycamore Networks Inc.
Operating Results for Six Months ended January 29, 2000
Description
Revenues
Cost of revenues and operating
expenses
Loss from operations

$ 000’s
48,559
60,415
(11,856)

In the eight months since May 1999 (see Table 6, above), Sycamore had
indeed earned revenues, which were more than $ 48 million. But it
incurred expenses of over $ 60 million to earn this revenue, resulting in an
operating loss of almost $ 12 million. But the market did not pay much
85

Sycamore Netwoks, Registration Statement in Form S-1, February 17, 2000, at p. 20.
Available online: http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1092367/0000927016-00000627.txt, May 2007.
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attention to these facts, and continued with runaway increases in the price
of Sycamore shares.
3. DISCLOSURES FOR SYCAMORE’S SECOND PUBLIC ISSUE – FEBRUARY 2000

We can now take a look at the disclosures in the registration statement
filed by Sycamore for its second public issue made in February-March
2000. As the data in Table 7 above show, the company incurred a loss of
almost $ 12 million from its operations during the six months ended
January 29, 2000. A reasonable and responsible management would
attempt to explain or justify the increase expenses during the period and
the resulting loss. Sycamore, however, made no efforts at any explanation
or justification. This is an indication of the low degree of responsibility
that informed the management of Sycamore and complacence about the
success of its second public issue despite the loss.
The description of “Risk Factors” in the second registration statement86 is
in the same vein as the first one.87 The risks are described at length and in
detail, bordering on relish. This is, again, clearly intended to protect the
management against any possible legal claims in the future regarding the
company and its prospects. The stated purposes of the second public
issue, extracted below, are also no different from those of the first.
The principal purposes of this offering are to obtain additional
working capital, create a larger public float for our common stock,
facilitate our future access to public capital markets and allow for
the orderly liquidation of a portion of the investments made by
certain of our stockholders.
We expect to use the net proceeds from the sale of shares of
common stock offered by us for general corporate purposes,
including for working capital and capital expenditures, and to
expand our sales and marketing operations, broaden our customer
support capabilities, develop new distribution channels and fund
research and development. We may use a portion of the net
86

Ibid. at p. 6-16.

87

Note 67, above.
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proceeds to acquire businesses, products or technologies that we
believe will complement our current or future business. However,
we have no specific acquisitions currently planned. We will retain
broad discretion in the allocation of the net proceeds of this
offering. Pending such uses, we plan to invest the net proceeds in
investment grade, interest-bearing securities.88
As at January 29, 2000, the period for which Sycamore provided financial
data before its second public issue, the company had “cash, cash
equivalents and marketable securities” totaling over $ 288 million, which
were mostly the proceeds from the first public issue. There is no reference
in the registration statement to any specific plan for the use of this large
amount of money. It is, therefore, difficult to see why Sycamore needed
more money for “general corporate purposes.” On the contrary, the
statement about “orderly liquidation” of investments by existing
stockholders is the clue to the real reason for the second issue.
Again, the market was hardly concerned either with the losses incurred by
Sycamore Networks, its pessimism about its future, or the fact that it was
approaching the market for a second time in seven months without any
serious business plans. On the contrary, the market increased the
valuation of the company almost four-fold, and offered more than $ 150
for the shares this time around.
If we have understood the efficient market theorists correctly, the “profitmaximizers” in the market would ensure that “actual prices of individual
securities already reflect the effects of information based both on events
that have already occurred and on events which, as of now, the market
expects to take place in the future.”89 It is not clear how the theory can
explain the almost four-fold increase in the price of Sycamore shares in a
span of seven months, a period of time when the company reported
worsening financials and continued to be pessimistic about its future.
To this question, the efficient market theorists might retort that the market
was then in a boom phase. But we have not been told that the Efficient
88

Sycamore Networks, Registration Statement in Form S-1, note 85, above at p. 17.

89

Eugene Fama, note 25, above.
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Markets Hypothesis would be suspended during times of boom or bust in
the market. On the contrary, it is asserted that the market prices would, at
“any point in time,” conform to the tenets of the Hypothesis.90
4. SYCAMORE AND ITS DISCLOSURES – THE TWO FACETS

In the case of Enron, we made a brief comparison between the sober and
balanced tone of the statements made by it in its statutory filings and the
bubbling enthusiasm and optimism that characterized its press releases. A
greater dichotomy is seen in the case of Sycamore Networks. We have
just recounted the pessimism and hopelessness which characterized the
disclosures made by Sycamore in its statutory filings. The company was,
however, simultaneously issuing a number of press releases, which were
completely different in their tone and content.91 They proudly announced
the various accomplishments of the company, bristled with optimism, and
painted a rosy future.
The press releases issued by Sycamore Networks during 1999 and 2000,
which were the heydays for the company’s shares, were singular for their
optimism and buoyancy. A few samples are given below, and they convey
the dominant mood in the run-up to the first public issue in August 1999.
Table 8
Sycamore Networks
Sample Press Releases: 1998-99
12/09/1998 Sycamore Networks Named One Of The Top 25 Startups For 1998
90

What is remarkable about new-fangled theories like the Efficient Markets Hypothesis is
not their content, which is bad enough. Rather, it is the fact that we have to put in so
much effort and argue eloquently against these absurd theories flipped at us casually by
scholars with a variety of agendas and representing special interests. It is quite
despairing, but public interest demands that such efforts are countered with energy and
determination, lest policy-making continue in the hands of special interests as has been
the case in the last almost three decades.

91

Complete texts of the press releases issued by Sycamore Networks available online:
http://www.sycamorenet.com/corporate/news/index.asp?id=pressreleases&prType=archi
ve, May 2007.
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03/08/1999 Sycamore Networks Announces Major Customer Commitment By
Williams Communications92
03/08/1999 Sycamore Networks Announces First Phase Of Intelligent Optical
Networking Strategy
05/12/1999 Upside Magazine Names Sycamore Networks Among 1999 Hot 100
Private Companies
05/17/1999 Sycamore Networks Named One of Top 100 By Red Herring
Magazine
05/24/1999 Sycamore Networks Selected By Millenium Optical Networks,
Representing Another Major Customer Win
06/07/1999 Sycamore Networks Announces The Industry's First End-To-End
Optical Network Management System
06/09/1999 Sycamore Networks Named Hot Startup By Telecommunications
Magazine
06/16/1999 Fortune Magazine Selects Sycamore Networks As One Of The 12
Cool Companies For 1999
The dichotomy between the statutory filings and other communications
from companies, such as press releases, raise vital questions about the
efficacy of the informational regime. On the one hand, we have the
statutory filings of companies in which companies make a set of
disclosures and forecasts, which are, at best, guarded in their optimism.
On the other, there are the press releases and media reports which are
laudatory and buoyant, and they convey a different picture or image.
It is tempting to discount the media reports with the specious argument
that they are not put out by the companies, but most news reports are
based on information provided by companies. Companies release
information to the media for specific purposes, mostly to present them in a
good light and influence trade in their shares in the stock market. In any
case, the case with press releases issued by the companies is quite

92

The wording of this headline and the contents of the press release are quite different
from the reference to William Communications in the risk factors narrated in the
registration statement filed by Sycamore Networks in August 1999, discussed earlier.
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different. Companies are the authors of these materials, and there is no
way we can sidestep their contents.
We now have to contend with two sources of information about public
corporations – statutory filings, and press releases and media reports.
Obviously, the informational regime expects the market to be guided by
the information in the statutory filings. But the position of the efficient
markets theorists on this issue – namely, whether the market is expected to
derive its information from the statutory filings or other sources, is not
clear. They might argue that the market will apply all the available
information, but the difficulty here is that the information is conflicting.
Therefore, it would not be possible for the market to make rational
decisions.
The significance of the caveat entered by Sycamore that investors “should
rely only on the information contained in this prospectus”93 lies in the
dichotomy among different sources of information. The company, in
effect, warned the market to ignore other material, such as press releases
issued by the company and media reports written about the company, in
making investment decisions. This is, however, not our main difficulty
because various statutory provisions, which are discussed a little later, as
well interpretations by the courts94 make it clear that all materials would
be relevant in considering the question of fraud or deceit in public issues
by companies.
Rather, the difficulty with multiple sources and conflicting information
about companies like Sycamore that their press releases are hardly untrue
or factually inaccurate. Therefore, they would not be “fraud” or “deceit”
either under the securities law or the common law. Let us now take a look
at a few examples of statutory provisions intended to check fraud or deceit
in public issues of securities by companies.95
93

Note 67, above.

94

Derry v. Peek (1889), 14 App. Cas. 337 (U.K.), was an early case in which the standard
of liability for company issuers was defined.

95

For a commentary on the law on fraud in securities issues, see generally Louis Loss &
Joel Seligman, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation, 5th ed. (New York: Aspen
Publishers, 2004), Chapter 9.
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•

“employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud” (Section 17(a),
Securities Act of 1933).

•

“obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading (ibid.).

•

“any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser” (ibid.).

•

“make, regarding any security registered on a national securities
exchange, for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such
security, any statement which was at the time and in the light of the
circumstances under which it was made, false or misleading with
respect to any material fact, and he knew or had reasonable ground
to believe was so false or misleading” (Section 9(a)(4), Securities
Exchange Act of 1934).

•

“induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of any security . .
. by means of any manipulative, deceptive or other fraudulent
device or contrivance” (Section 15(c)(1)(A), Securities Exchange
Act).

Quite obviously, it would be difficult to bring an action under any of these
provisions with respect to the press releases of Sycamore.96 The caution
sounded by Sycamore at the beginning of the registration statement is
specifically intended to guard against such efforts.97 But it can hardly be
disputed that the press releases contributed to the mood of euphoria in the
96

Actions were, however, brought against Sycamore Networks and investment bankers
with respect to the public issues and their dealings in the shares, as we will see a little
later. The company has opted to make a settlement with the litigants, and has not
defended itself against the charges.

97

Here, we cannot also lose sight of the fact that the scheme of statutory provisions is
designed for ex post remedy for the victims through contentious litigation. Their
effectiveness in preventing cases like Sycamore Networks is rather limited.
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market and to the success of the two public issues of Sycamore. They also
encouraged active trade in Sycamore shares during the period. The
existing regulatory framework, which has disclosures as its underpinning,
has no answer to such situations.
The case of Sycamore illustrates the inadequacies of merely relying on
disclosures. This approach is perfunctory and simplistic. Regulation
mandates companies to make regular disclosures, and in particular,
highlight the risk factors. It assumes that investors, acting in a vacuum
and without being influenced by any other factors, will be guided only by
the statutory disclosures and arrive at rational decisions on the basis of the
disclosures.

5. ISSUE PRICE FOR SHARES – DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN
INSIDERS AND THE PUBLIC
We have earlier referred to the license available in law for corporations to
determine the consideration payable for the issue of their shares.
Sycamore Networks offers an effective demonstration of the practical
implications of this license. At the time of the first public issue in August
1999, the company had about 5.44 million shares of the par value of $
0.001 outstanding, and its paid-in capital was $ 5.49 million.98 This
indicates that each share was issued at a consideration of about $ 1,
although it is not clear if the consideration was paid in cash. Needless to
add, all these shares were held by insiders.
The company had also issued 15 million shares of its preferred stock to
some private investors for a total consideration of $ 40.77 million.99 The
average consideration for the preferred shares was, therefore, about $ 3 per
share. The funding provided by these investors, quite obviously, sustained
the operations of the company in the early stages and in meeting the
expenses of the public issue. The 15 million preferred shares issued to
private investors were converted three-fold into 47.28 million common
98

Sycamore registration statement, note 67, above at p. 18.

99

Ibid.
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shares on completion of the first public issue.100 The average cost of the
resulting common shares in the hands of these private investors was,
therefore, about $ 0.86.
Sycamore made the first public issue at $ 38, and share price rose to $ 105
by January 2000. This meant exponential rises in the value of shares
issued to the insiders and the private investors, acquired at $ 1 each or less.
The deal was thus lucrative for all of them. In addition, shares were also
issued under the Employee Stock Option Plans of the company.101
The insiders and their associates were apparently not satisfied with the
windfall from the public listing of Sycamore shares. Just before the
second public issue, the company made a three-for-one stock split in
February 2000. This, of course, suited everyone; the insiders, their
support group which had earlier acquired preferred shares, and the persons
who had purchased the common shares in the public issue or in the market
subsequently. Everybody’s wealth tripled, just like that, and who could
possibly object to that!
By these processes, the number of outstanding common shares increased
from a humble 5.44 million before the first public issue shares in August
1999 to a phenomenal 236 million shares by January 2000, before the
second public issue at $ 152.50 per share.102 After completion of the
second public issue, the number of outstanding shares was about 245
million.103 Of this, the total number of shares issued to the public was
only 7.5 million (first issue) and 8.4 million (second issue), or less than ten
percent!
The insiders and their associates acquired their shares at a consideration of
$ 1 or less, and shares of the same class were issued to the public at $ 38 in
August 1999, and $ 152.50 in February 2000. Neither corporate law nor
securities law has anything to say on such issues. On the contrary,
100

Sycamore quarterly report, note 81, above at p. 8.

101

Sycamore registration statement, note 85, above at p. 18.

102

Ibid.

103

Sycamore quarterly statement, note 82, above at p. 3.
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corporate law endorses the right of companies to indulge in such actions.
The question is how the license in law for such practices defines the
culture of corporations and the stock market, which are two important
institutions in the society, and shapes their behaviour and the larger value
systems in the society.
The personal profit made by the insiders at dubious technology companies
during the .com bubble was a matter of debate after the bubble burst in
2001.104 It is reported that Gururaj Deshpande, the founder-chairman of
Sycamore, raked in $ 726 million from the sale of his shares in the
company.105

B. PUBLIC ISSUES AND THEIR LEGITIMACY
We have seen that Sycamore Networks had no ascertained need for capital
for either of the two public issues made by it. Taking advantage of the
sentiment in the stock market favour of companies that had something to
do with the Internet, Sycamore approached the stock market, twice in a
span of seven months, and collected over one and a half billion dollars.
Public issues of this variety raise the question of legitimacy of public
issues of shares by companies. The question of legitimacy of public issues
is a longstanding one in the history of Anglo-American corporate law.
The earliest official reference to public issues by dubious companies is
found in a report of the Board of Trade in England, prepared in 1696.106
In the United States, censoring of public issues was attempted in Kansas
during early twentieth century, under the so-called “blue-sky laws.”107
Companies required governmental clearance before they could make
public issues.
104

See e.g. Mark Gimein “Greedy Bunch – You Bought They Sold” Fortune, 2
September 2002.
105

Ibid.
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See Ronald Ralph Formoy, The Historical Foundations of Modern Company Law
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1923) at 16.
107

See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, “Origin of the Blue-sky Laws” (1991)
70 Texas L. Rev. 347.
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The federal securities law regime, introduced in the 1930s, avoided such
activist intervention, and stopped with requiring companies to make
disclosures. The present position is that if a company does not have any
need for capital but still makes a public issue, it has to state so. It is left to
the investors to decide whether they want to invest in the shares of the
company. Securities regulations designate companies without any need
for capital as “blank check companies,” and expressly permit to make
public issues.108 However, such companies must deposit the proceeds
from the issue in an escrow account or in specified securities.109
The regulatory regime outlined above is clear that it would permit, rather
than prevent public issues. This is a basic issue with the Securities
Regime, as it has developed. It seeks to mostly to promote the stock
market and trading transactions in the market. The systemic checks are
quite few and limited, and are called into play only in cases of gross abuse
or fraud.
The securities regime is hardly concerned with the
circumstances in which companies can approach the market. In other
words, it ignores the question of legitimacy of public issues.
Sycamore Networks is an example of the consequences of this approach in
which the law, representing public policy, has no concern for the
legitimacy for public issues other than to require companies to state that
they have no legitimate purpose for the issue! Let us now look at what
Sycamore has done with the large sum of money it collected from the
public for no specific reason. The following table gives the key financials
of Sycamore since its second public issue in March 2000, until April 29,
2006, which is the latest date for which the company has submitted
reports, at this writing in June 2007.110
Table 9
108

Ibid. Section 3(b)(3).

109

Regulation C (17 CFR Part 230), Rule 419.

110

Data are taken from the annual reports of Sycamore Networks in Form 10-K for the
fiscal years ended July 29 of 2000-2005. Data for April 2006 taken from the quarterly
report in Form 10-Q for the quarter ended April 29, 2006. Reports available online:
www.sec.gov, under CIK # 0001092367, May 2007.
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Sycamore Networks
Financial Data 2000-2006
2000

Revenue
Operating results
Interest income
Net income
Cash and investments
Shareholders' equity

198
-11
41
31
1,512
1,575

2001

375
-352
85
-267
1,249
1,388

2002
$ '000s
65
-395
40
-380
1,044
1,039

2003

38
-78
23
-55
996
993

2004

45
-61
16
-44
961
955

2005

2006
(9 months)

65
-40
14
-25
955
940

It is apparent that Sycamore Networks has been utilizing the money it
collected from the public issues for funding the operating losses incurred
by it year after year. Its business has been a nonstarter. As of April 2006,
there was a balance of $ 971 million, against the original sum of $ 1,512
million collected from the public issues in 1999 and 2000. More than $
500 million have been expended in the period of six years, during which
shareholders’ equity declined from $ 1,575 million (2000) to $ 977 million
(2006).
If we were to be guided by the registration statements of Sycamore, the
outcome indicated by the financial results is not surprising. After all, the
company did eloquently describe how bleak it expected its future to be,
and its expectations have not been belied! Given the track record and
tendencies of Sycamore, it was inevitable that lawsuits would be filed
against it in connection with its public issues. Filed they were in July
2001, less than eighteen months after the second public issue, made in
February-March 2000. The company made its first statement about the
class actions filed against it in its report for the quarter ended April 29,
2001:
The amended complaint [against the company] alleges violations
of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, primarily based on the
assertion that the Company’s lead underwriters, the Company and

56
-4
27
23
971
977
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the other named defendants made material false and misleading
statements in the Company’s Registration Statements and
Prospectuses filed with the SEC in October 1999 and March 2000
because of the failure to disclose (a) the alleged solicitation and
receipt of excessive and undisclosed commissions by the
underwriters in connection with the allocation of shares of
common stock to certain investors in the allocation of shares of
common stock to certain investors in the Company’s public
offerings and (b) that certain of the underwriters allegedly had
entered into agreements with investors whereby underwriters
agreed to allocate the public offering shares in exchange for which
the investors agreed to make additional purchases of stock in the
aftermarket at predetermined prices.111
These were the facts alleged against the company, and its response to the
litigation was typically vague, evasive and non-committal. It stated:
The Company believes that the claims against it are without merit
and intends to defend against the complaints vigourously. The
Company is not currently able to estimate the possibility of loss or
range of loss, if any, relating to these claims.112
But Sycamore Networks reneged on its statement about defending the
claims, and has opted to make a settlement. This raises questions about
the seriousness with which it made the above statement, and the
complicity of the officers of the company in the wrongful acts alleged
against them. The latest statutory report filed by Sycamore Networks is
for the quarter ended April 29, 2006, and it has information about the
litigation. The following extracts from the report explain the current
position:

111

Sycamore Networks quarterly report in Form 10-Q for the quarter ended April 29,
2002,
at
p.
31.
Available
online:
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1092367/000092701602003167/000092701602-003167.txt, May 2007.
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The Company, the Individual Defendants, the plaintiff class and
the vast majority of the other approximately three hundred issuer
defendants and the individual defendants currently or formerly
associated with those companies approved a settlement and related
agreements (the “Settlement Agreement”) which set forth the terms
of a settlement between these parties. Among other provisions, the
Settlement Agreement provides for a release of the Company and
the Individual Defendants for the conduct alleged in the action to
be wrongful and for the Company to undertake certain
responsibilities, including agreeing to assign away, not assert, or
release, certain potential claims the Company may have against its
underwriters. In addition, no payments will be required by the
issuer defendants under the Settlement Agreement to the extent
plaintiffs recover at least $1 billion from the Underwriter
Defendants, who are not parties to the Settlement Agreement.113
But that is not the full story. Sycamore went on:
On March 20, 2006, the Underwriter Defendants submitted
objections to the settlement to the Court. The Court held a hearing
regarding these and other objections to the settlement at a fairness
hearing on April 24, 2006, but it has not yet issued a ruling. There
is no assurance that the court will grant final approval to the
settlement. If the Settlement Agreement is not approved and the
Company is found liable, we are unable to estimate or predict the
potential damages that might be awarded, whether such damages
would be greater than the Company’s insurance coverage, and
whether such damages would have a material impact on our results
of operations or financial condition in any future period.114
At this writing in May 2007, Sycamore Networks is under an investigation
ordered by the audit committee of its board of directors with respect to
113

Sycamore Networks quarterly report in Form 10-Q for the quarter ended April 29,
2002,
at
p.
40.
Available
online:
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1092367/000119312506118073/d10q.htm#tx93
808_11, May 2007.
114

Ibid. at p. 41.
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grant of stock options, and has not filed statutory reports since April 2006.
Its shares were in danger of being de-listed from Nasdaq due to the failure
to furnish reports, but the action has been temporarily stayed.115
The events at Sycamore clearly illustrate the absence of responsible
management in the company, and its opportunistic use of the stock market
to make money, both for the company and its insiders. There is also
empirical evidence that opportunistic corporate behaviour with respect to
the stock market quite often translates into business failure.116
When we speak about legitimacy of public issues, it is not in any sense
abstract. Thereby hang much larger issues, such as responsible corporate
management, use of the stock market to raise capital for genuine and
beneficial economic purposes, serious as against speculative investment in
corporate shares, and so on. In other words, we are talking about the
whole philosophy that underlies the stock market and corporate
arrangements. We briefly touch upon these issues in the concluding part
of the paper.

IV. AMAZON.COM
Amazon.com, a pioneer in trade through the Internet, or “e-commerce,”
entered the stock market during the late 1990s riding on the Internet boom.
It made a relatively small public issue of $ 54 million in May 1997. The
price of Amazon.com shares consistently rose during 1997-2001, contrary
to the business reports of company, which betrayed an equally consistent
worsening of its financial position.
The case of Amazon.com has some similarities with Sycamore Networks,
which we have just discussed, but the distinctions between the two
115

Sycamore Networks press release “Sycamore Granted Stay to Remain Listed on
Nasdaq”
17
April
2007,
available
online:
http://www.sycamorenet.com/corporate/news/index.asp?id=pressrelease&command=live
&news_item_id=832, May 2007.
116

See e.g. Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, “Vicarious Liability for Fraud on
Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence” [1992] U. Ill. L. Rev. 691.
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companies are more striking. Amazon.com was founded in 1994, before
the Internet boom gathered momentum in the stock market, and made its
public issue in 1997. Sycamore Networks, on the other hand, was founded
in 1998 at the height of the Internet boom, and made two public issues in
the following years –1999 and 2000.
Amazon.Com was originally incorporated in the state of Washington, and
shifted its incorporation to Delaware just before its public issue in 1997.
This indicates that a public issue of shares was not the primary
consideration for the company. But it was different with Sycamore
Networks, which was formed in Delaware. Quite obviously, the plan was
to take advantage of the market sentiment in favour of technology
companies, and make public issues as quickly as possible. In this plan of
Sycamore Networks, Delaware’s loose corporate law regime was an
important element.
A second feature was that Jeffrey Bezos, the founder of Amazon.com, was
particular about retaining control of the company even after the public
issue, and prominently highlighted his intentions in the registration
statement filed for the public issue made by the company in 1997. This
indicates a degree of commitment on the part of Jeffrey Bezos to the
company. Bezos laid emphasis on the long term, and in his first annual
letter to the investors after the public issue, he warned:
Because of our emphasis on the long term, we may make decisions
and weigh tradeoffs differently than some companies. Accordingly,
we want to share with you our fundamental management and
decision-making approach so that you, our shareholders, may
confirm that it is consistent with your investment philosophy.117
The letter from which the passage is extracted was written by Jeffrey
Bezos in March 1998, and the progress achieved by Amazon.com in the
last ten years, which we trace in the course of our discussion here, is
standing testimony to the business philosophy of the company. In
contrast, we have seen that the operations of Sycamore Networks, a
117

Jeffrey Bezos’ letter dated March 30, 1998, to the shareholders of Amazon.Com, at p.
2.
Available online: http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=97664&p=irolreportsAnnual, May 2007.
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younger company which collected over $ 1.5 billion from the market are
paralyzed, and the company is in decline. Amazon.com has been
successful in establishing an e-commerce model for retail sales, and has
displayed considerable grit and energy in the process of doing so.

A. AMAZON.COM PUBLIC ISSUE
As we noted earlier, Amazon.com, founded in 1994, made its initial and
only public issue in May 1997. Three million shares, a relatively small
number representing about a sixth of the total number shares outstanding
after the issue, were offered to the public. The issue price targeted by the
company was $ 13 per share, but in the febrile conditions which prevailed
in the market at the time of the issue, the company was able to get a price
of $ 18. The net proceeds from the issue, after deducting issue expenses,
were about $ 49 million.118
The market was apparently optimistic about Amazon.com and its
prospects, going by the fact that the price of $ 18 offered by it was more
than the company’s target of $ 13. To assess how far the optimism was in
accord with the disclosures made and information provided by
Amazon.com, we must turn to the registration statement filed by it for the
public issue. The registration statement started on a positive note,
referring to “the opportunity for online book retaining,” and the belief of
Amazon.com that the retail book industry is particularly suited to online
retailing for many compelling reasons.”119 The company affirmed its
intention “to use technology to deliver an outstanding service offering and
to achieve the significant economies inherent in the online store model.”
It also reported that it had “grown rapidly since opening its first
bookstore.”120
118

Amazon.com quarterly report in Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 1997, at p.
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These statements reflect a sense of purpose and commitment, which were
noticeably lacking in Sycamore Networks. But Amazon.com, like
Sycamore Networks, had an accumulated deficit at the time of filing its
registration statement, and it was to the tune of $ 9 million. Again like
Sycamore Networks, Amazon.com also had no specific business needs for
raising capital from the market through a public issue of its shares. It
described the use of proceeds from the public issue in the following
words:
The principal purposes of this offering are to obtain additional
capital, to create a public market for the Common Stock, to
facilitate future access by the Company to public equity markets,
and to provide increased visibility and credibility in a marketplace
where many of the Company's current and potential competitors
are or will be publicly held companies. The Company has no
specific plan for the net proceeds of the offering. The Company
expects to use the net proceeds for general corporate purposes,
including working capital to fund anticipated operating losses and
capital expenditures.121
Amazon.com made no efforts to hide the fact that it looked to the public
issue for enhancing its profile. This is an illustration of the consequences
of engineering corporations as finance mechanisms, rather than business
vehicles. Public issue of shares and their listing on stock exchanges
emerge as ends in themselves, and cease to be means for business ends –
namely, raising capital for business needs. Amazon.com made the
following further statements with respect to use of proceeds from the
public issue.
A portion of net proceeds may also be used to acquire or invest in
complementary businesses, products and technologies. From time
to time, in the ordinary course of business, the Company expects to
evaluate potential acquisitions of such businesses, products or
technologies. However, the Company has no present

121
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understandings, commitments or agreements with respect to any
material acquisitions or investments.122
These statements indicate that the company might use the proceeds from
the issue to advance its strategy of business development through
acquisitions. Amazon.com did, in fact, embark on a path of business
growth through acquisitions, but hardly used the proceeds from the public
issue for the purpose. Instead, it went on a spree of issuing fresh shares to
acquire new businesses, as we will see in Section (c), below.
In describing the risk factors, Amazon.com shared the “gloom-and-doom”
approach of Sycamore. The risk factors were described with eloquence
bordering on relish, and a very uncertain future was predicted for the
company.123 The tendency of companies like Amazon.com and Sycamore
Networks to take pains to paint bleak futures is an unintended
consequence of the informational regime, and stresses the need for a more
refined regulatory approach. The requirement for disclosure of risk factors
is used as a shield for issuers, rather than a source of information to the
investors.
But the market was unfazed by the gloomy future predicted by
Amazon.com, and rewarded the company with a price of $ 18 per share.
The public issue of Amazon.com was successful. Not only did the market
improve upon the expectations of Amazon.com with respect to the issue
price, there were also huge increases in the price of Amazon.com shares
when trading started in the stock exchanges during the heady days of
Internet boom.
The public issue was undoubtedly effective in improving the financial
position of the existing shareholders of Amazon.com. The company had
over 15 million shares of common stock outstanding at the time of its
public issue. In addition, its preferred stock had conversion rights on
completion of the public issue, and the number of shares held by existing
holders was over 20 million after the public issue. At the issue price of $
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18 per share, the existing shareholders of Amazon.com were, in theory,
put in control of liquid assets of the market value of about $ 360 million.
The public issue gave the shares of Amazon.com a ready value and
“liquidity,” or the ability to convert the shares into cash by sale in the
stock market. These would prove to be crucial for the business
development plans of Amazon.com in the following years, when the
company used the market value of its shares to acquire a number of
businesses. The business development strategy of Amazon.com and its
implications are the subject of Section (c), below.

B. AMAZON SHARE PRICES AND FUNDAMENTALS
Amazon.com shares issued in May 1997 at $ 18 per share reached $ 100 in
a year. The company apparently treated the $ 100 price level as a
watershed, and resorted to a two-for-one stock split in June 1998.124 The
number of Amazon.com shares doubled, but there was no let up in the
enthusiasm of the market. In December 1998, six months after the split,
the price reached a high of over $ 360, and in the next month, January
1999, Amazon.com effected a second split, this time three-for-one. The
number of its shares simply tripled!
The market took the second split also in its stride, and maintained the price
of Amazon.com shares at over $ 100 almost all through 1999, with the
price reaching a peak of $ 222 in April 1999. Only in August 1999, the
price fell marginally below the $ 100 mark, to $ 98, and this lasted for a
short while. Amazon.com resorted to yet another stock-split in the next
month, September 1999, this time in the ratio of two-for-one. After this
third round, the company has not made any stock-splits. Amazon.com
shares touched a low of about $ 6 in August 2001 when the .com bubble in
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We have earlier referred to the fact that Amazon.com shifted its incorporation from
Washington to Delaware, just before the public issue in May 1997. The decision of
Amazon.com to shift its incorporation to Delaware clearly indicated its intention to take
full advantage of the lax and pro-stock market corporate law regime of Delaware.
Delaware General Corporation Law (Delaware Code, Title 8, Chapter 1) does not
specifically enable or authorize stock splits, but it recognizes the concept (Section 173).
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the stock market burst, but it has gradually gained ground thereafter. At
this writing in June 2007, the price is about $ 70 per share.125
Let us now take a look at the financials of Amazon.com, to understand
how they relate with the movement in share prices during the first five
years of trading in the shares of the company.126
Table 10
Amazon.com
Business Data: 1997-2001

1 Sales
2 Operating results
3 Net Income

1997

1998

1999

2000
($ '000s)

2001

148
-33
-31

610
-112
-125

1640
-606
-720

2762
-864
-1411

3122
-412
-567

If we were to be guided by the principles of investment outlined by
Graham and Dodd,127 which pay close attention to earnings and dividends,
the shares of Amazon.com would be a nonstarter. The company was
incurring huge losses during the period, and there was no question of any
dividend. Nonetheless, the price of its shares saw runaway increases,
which cannot be supported by the financial results reflected in the above
table. Amazon.com was building up losses, and was able to survive only
125

Historical prices of Amazon.com, and dates of stock-splits available online:
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=AMZN, May 2007.
126

Data taken from the annual reports of Amazon.com in Form 10-K for the respective
years.
Forms available online: http://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?type=10k&dateb=&owner=include&count=40&action=getcompany&CIK=0001018724,
June
2007.
127

Benjamin Graham and David Dodd, Security Analysis, (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, Inc.,
1934)
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by taking on huge debt. But as we noted earlier, the new theory was that
the conventional approach to investment in the stock market128 was not
valid for technology companies; the high valuation given by the market for
technology companies was because of their future potential, rather than
current fundamentals.129 This takes us to the question of forecasts made
by Amazon.com during the period.
The forecasts made by the company in the statutory reports filed during
this period were on the side of pessimism. The report for 1998,130 which
presented the forecasts for 1999, is a good example of the trend. It began
with statements on “anticipated losses”131 and “unpredictability of future
revenues,”132 and these were followed up with forecasts of the following
variety:
[t]he Company believes that it will continue to incur substantial
operating losses for the foreseeable future and that the rate at
which such losses will be incurred may increase significantly from
current levels. Although the Company has experienced significant
revenue growth in recent periods, such growth rates are not
sustainable and will decrease in the future.133
Due to the foregoing factors, in one or more future quarters the
Company's operating results may fall below the expectations of
128

It is an open question how far there are any conventions or standards with respect to
investment in the stock market. Speculation and irrational prices have always been
present in the financial markets ever since they came into existence in England in the late
seventeenth century. See generally Stuart Banner, Anglo-American Securities Regulation
1690-1860: Political and Cultural Roots (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998)
and Edward Chancellor, Devil Take the Hindmost: A History of Financial Speculation
(New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1999).
129

For a critique of the argument that technology companies had some hidden potential
for enormous future profits, see William Bonner and Addison Wiggin, note 44, above.
130

Available online: http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1018724/0000891020-98000448.txt, May 2007.
131

Ibid. at p. 5.

132

Ibid. at p. 6.

133

Ibid. at p. 15.
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securities analysts and investors. In such event, the trading price of
the common stock would likely be materially adversely affected.134
We have already referred to the fact that Amazon.com was borrowing
heavily to sustain its operations. It also disclosed that the agreements with
its lenders placed restrictions on payment of “dividends and distributions
to the stockholders.” This made the payment of dividends doubtful as long
as the company carried debt. Adding to the air of gloom, Amazon.com
also stated that the terms of its contract with the lenders “may reduce the
Company's operational flexibility and may limit its ability to pursue
market opportunities.”135 These were as far as the disclosures in statutory
documents went. The tone and contents of other communications from the
company were somewhat different.
Jeffrey Bezos’ annual letter to the shareholders written in March 1999,
around the same time when the statutory report was filed, had little of the
attitude of caution and pessimism which characterized the statutory report.
Instead, the letter displays considerable optimism and a “will-do” spirit.
The letter written in March 1999 continued with the emphasis on the longterm seen in the previous year’s letter, and asserted that:
Amazon.com has made a number of strides forward in the past
year, but there is still an enormous amount to learn and to do. We
remain optimistic, but we also know we must remain vigilant and
maintain a sense of urgency. We face many challenges and
hurdles. Among them, aggressive, capable and well-funded
competition; the growth challenges and execution risk associated
with our own expansion; and the need for large continuing
investments to meet an expanding market opportunity.
The dichotomy between the tone and contents of the statutory report and
statements made in the letter to the shareholders raise the same question
we have raised earlier with respect to Enron and Sycamore Networks –
which is the information that influences the stock market? If it is the
practice of the market to mostly rely on non-official information, then
134

Ibid. at p. 16.

135

Ibid. at p. 30.
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what is the whole point about the elaborate reporting mechanism
mandated under securities law?136
To reiterate, the increases seen in the price of Amazon.com shares cannot
be explained by the information contained in its statutory reports. As we
will see a little later, the company continued to issue shares every year,
which added to the volume of shares in circulation. According to
conventional economic theory with respect to demand, supply and prices,
increases in supply ought to have resulted in lower prices, but that did not
happen. On the contrary, prices continued to climb. This would indicate
that demand increased at a quicker pace than supply, and the result was
increase in prices even as the supply position improved.
A reason for the selection of Amazon.com as a case for study is, as noted
earlier, the forecast made by Henry Blodget. Blodget was, at that time, an
investment analyst working for the investment firm CIBC Oppenheimer.
During late 1998, at the height of the Internet boom in the stock market, he
made his famous forecast that Amazon shares would reach a price level of
$ 400.137 Blodget made no reference to the fundamentals of the company
while making his prediction about the price of its shares.
Apparently, Henry Blodget’s forecast for the shares of Amazon.com was
based on the demand-supply position for Internet stocks in the stock
market of the time.138 This is rather strange, because we have not been
told by the efficient market theorists that demand and supply conditions in
the market could affect share prices, or that the demand for the shares of
companies could exist independently of the information available about
them. In other words, there could be a huge demand for the shares of a
company despite negative information reported by the company. Just to
136

On this question, see generally Susan M. Phillips, The SEC and the Public Interest
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981).
137

Dan Mitchell & Scott Martin, “Amazon up 46 percent; report “clarified,’” 16
December 1998. Available online: http://news.com.com/2100-1017-219176.html, May
2007.
138

This is supported by the statements Henry Blodget made in “If I knew then what I
know now” interview with eCompany Now, March 2001.
Available online:
http://www.timeinc.net/b2/subscribers/articles/print/0,17925,513201,00.html, May 2007.
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make sure, we reexamined the Efficient Market Hypothesis,139 but not
could find any reference.
According to the Efficient Markets theory, it is information and only
information that will guide the market. For reasons that are not clear, the
market apparently believed that Henry Blodget was privy to some special
information which was not known to others or that he had some prescience
which others lacked, and readily accepted his guidance.140 Amazon.com
shares did not reach the target of $ 400 set for them by Blodget, but at $
362, they came close enough. This is an illustration of the characteristic of
reflexivity of the stock market, or its tendency for self-fulfilling
prophecies, which has been pointed out by writers like George Soros141
and Robert Shiller.142 Quite often, share prices rise only because the
market expects them to rise.

C. AMAZON’S BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT MODEL AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS
The business of Amazon.com has indeed grown rapidly. We have seen
that its sales climbed from $ 148 million in 1997 to $ 3,122 million in
2001. Sales have since grown to $ 10,711 billion in 2006. Let us now
take a look at the strategy employed by Amazon.com for its business
growth. Table 11 below presents data with respect to the capital, longterm debt and “goodwill and other purchased intangibles” of Amazon.com
for the period 1997-2001.143
139

Eugene Fama, Note 25, above.

140

Henry Blodget has since been found guilty of market manipulation and is permanently
barred from participating in the stock market. See SEC press release dated April 28,
2003. Available online: http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-56.htm, June 2007.
141

George Soros, The Crisis of Global Capitalism: Open Society Endangered (New York:
Public Affairs, 1998).

142
143

Robert Shiller, Irrational Exuberance (New York: Broadway Books, 2001).

Data taken from balance sheets of respective years, available in annual reports in Form
10-K filed by Amazon.com, note 126, above. Particulars of stock issued for business
acquisition taken from the Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows in the annual report for
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Table 11
Amazon.com
Share Capital and Related Data: 1997-2001
1997
1 Value of stock issued for
business acquisitions
2 Goodwill and intangibles
acquired or added
3 Goodwill and intangibles
amortized or written off
4 Long-term debt
5 Total paid-in capital
6 Accumulated deficit
7 Shareholders' equity
8 No.of outstanding shares

1998
0

1999
($ '000s)
217
774

0

229

77
68
-38
29
145

2000

2001
32

5

766

47

80

43

215

522

363

348
302
-162
139
318

1466
1198
-882
266
345

2127
1342
-2293
-967
357

2156
1467
-2861
-1440
373

In a span of four years from 1998 to 2001, Amazon.com issued shares of
the value of $ 1,028 million towards business acquisitions. Issue of shares
for business development through acquisitions was an effective strategy
adopted by Amazon.com. We have seen that the company had suggested
in its registration statement filed in 1997 that it might apply a part of the
proceeds from the public for acquisition of new businesses. Apparently, it
did not do so. But it made use of the public issue and the resulting
“liquid” character of its shares to go on a spree of acquisition of businesses
by issuing its shares as the consideration.
The shares of Amazon.com, as we have seen, traded at high prices during
the period, and quite obviously, the persons who sold their businesses to
Amazon.com were willing to accept the shares as consideration. By
issuing its shares towards purchase consideration, Amazon.com was able
to acquire new businesses without any payment. This was important
because Amazon.com, with its huge losses and debt, was in no position to
pay any monetary consideration. As a business strategy, the issue of
1999, at p. 36. The outstanding share numbers given in the table are after considering the
three stock splits made by Amazon.com, one in 1998 and two in 1999.
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shares for acquisition of businesses can hardly be faulted. It was an
effective method of acquiring business assets for the company.
The issue of shares for acquisition of businesses in the manner described
above leads some interesting results. As we noted earlier, Amazon.com
did not, in fact, could not pay any monetary consideration for its
acquisitions. Taking advantage of the high price of its shares in the stock
market, the company issued shares as the consideration, and the persons to
whom the shares were issued could sell them in the market if they wanted
money. In other words, Amazon.com successfully created an arrangement
in which investors in the stock market will take care of payment for its
business acquisitions, if the persons who sold their businesses to the
company wanted cash.
The business acquisitions made by Amazon.com were accounted under
“goodwill and other purchased tangibles,” which is explained in the notes
to the financial statements for 1998:144
Goodwill and Other Purchased Intangibles
Goodwill and other purchased intangibles represent the excess of
the purchase price over the fair value of assets acquired. Total
goodwill of approximately $215.7 million and other purchased
intangibles of approximately $13.3 million are stated net of total
accumulated amortization of $42.6 million at December 31, 1998
in the accompanying balance sheet.
It was also clarified that “goodwill and substantially all other purchased
intangibles are being amortized on a straight-line basis over lives ranging
from two to three years.” This means that the asset, acquired at huge
value by the issue of shares, would be worthless after a short period of two
to three years. True to its word, Amazon.com wrote off assets of the value
of $ 1,122 million in the four years, 1997-2001.
Amazon.com, having acquired assets worth over a billion dollars over four
years and issued shares towards the consideration payable for them, wrote
144

Note 126, above.
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off the assets and eliminated them from its financial statements. This is
recognition that the assets had lost their commercial value. This was duly
reflected in the huge deficits which the company accumulated, and in the
erosion of its shareholders’ equity.
However, the shares issued by Amazon.com for the acquisition of the
assets that have been written off continue to circulate in the market, and
they command significant value. This is a curious situation, to put it
mildly. If we accept that the assets for which the shares were issued
subsequently lost their value and were eliminated by the company, then
there must be some impact on the shares issued towards their acquisition.
But in the present arrangement, there is no such impact, and the shares
continue in the market without the slightest disturbance.145
It is difficult to characterize the wealth represented by the market value of
the shares issued by Amazon.com as consideration for the assets which it
acquired and subsequently eliminated. A possible term would be
“fictitious” or “artificial” wealth, but that would be hardly accurate. After
all, the wealth represented by these shares is real, and exists in the stock
market; it is hardly fictitious or artificial in that sense.146 But the question
is whether this variety of wealth, made possible by the legal arrangements
in the society, is desirable.
Before concluding, we must take note of the fact that the long-term
commitment stressed by Jeffrey Bezos, the founder of Amazon.com, is
paying off, and the company has consolidated its position in recent years.
Its progress is evident from its business data for the last five years given in
the table below, and they vindicate our earlier observation about the
qualitative difference between Amazon.com and Sycamore Networks.
145

In a more responsible system, there would be a requirement that the portion of capital
represented by the eliminated assets must also be eliminated. As a result, the number of
shares of the company would shrink proportionately, but such things are almost
unthinkable in the stock market-dominated, libertarian corporate system now prevailing
in the United States.

146

In the context of the present monetary system in which money can be generated by the
government at will, it is possible to argue that wealth is essentially artificial or fictitious.
Therefore, there is nothing inherently wrong with the “wealth” represented by the market
value of the shares issued by a company towards assets that have been written off.
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Table 12
Amazon.com
Business Data: 2002-2006

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Sales
Operating results
Net Income
Long-term debt
Total paid-in capital
Accumulated deficit
Shareholders' equity
No.of outstanding shares

2002

2003

3923
64
-149
2277
1654
-3010
-1353
388

5264
270
35
1945
1893
-2974
-1036
403

2004
($ '000s)
6921
440
588
1855
2129
-2386
-227
410

2005

2006

8490
432
359
1480
2267
-2027
246
414

10711
389
190
1247
2521
-1837 *
431
416

* Amazon.com repurchased stock to the extent of $ 252 million.

Amazon.com is proof that e-commerce is basically a viable business
model, and neither the commitment of Jeffrey Bezos, nor the faith of the
investors is misplaced. Amazon.com has done a good job of establishing
the model, and has consolidated its business. But the nagging question
that remains is whether all this could have been done in a more responsible
and healthier manner. Could the business not have been developed
without the stock market excesses, issue of shares by the company in a
casual manner, speculative frenzy in the shares, and the resulting
“fictitious” wealth to which we have referred?147 Now that the company is
on the path to reasonable financial health, it has not lost any time in
making efforts to influence the stock market, which is evident from the
repurchase of stock made by it in 2006. Amazon.com applied $ 252
147

To the extent that the practices of Amazon.com have contributed and continue to
contribute to trade and “wealth creation” in the stock market, it is at least in line with
governmental policy. Since the late 1980s, the financial markets have emerged as the
defining feature of the American system. It has also been actively exported to other
countries as part of the globalization movement. See generally Joseph E. Stiglitz, note
26, above.

76

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 04 NO. 01

million for the repurchase, when its net income was $ 190 million and it
still carried debts of over $ 1.2 billion.

V. CONCLUSION
The close relationship between business corporations and the stock market
is a self-evident fact.148 The two institutions are governed by legislation;
indeed, companies or corporations are the products of statutes, and would
have no existence without sanction in law. At present, there is little effort
to regulate corporations. Although an elaborate regulatory framework has
been developed for the stock market, its effectiveness in checking market
excesses and negative tendencies is questionable. The case-studies
reported in this paper offer additional evidence of the limitations of the
present regulatory regime.
The statutes under which corporations are created treat them almost
exclusively as issuers of securities, and do not recognize any other role for
them. This narrow approach of the statute ignores the reality of the large
role played by corporations in modern societies. Lawrence E. Mitchell
observed:
The modern corporation is a social and political institution - an
institution in which people go to work not only to make a living
but to help find meaning and friendship in the process; an
institution that by the products it produces, the services it offers,
and the methods by which it markets them has an enormous effect
on the way we think about our lives and the goals we pursue; an
institution that involves itself in the mechanisms of government to
help determine the ways our laws are made and the way our wealth
is distributed.149
148

Indeed, the first official document on the subject, a report of the Board of Trade in
England prepared in 1696, emphasized the relationship between the nascent stock market
and joint-stock companies. See note 106, above. This has since been the theme of most
literature on corporations. See e.g. Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, note 21,
above.
149

Lawrence E. Mitchell, note 52, above at p. 6-7
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Corporate statutes pointedly ignore the reality of corporations described
above, and confine themselves to (a) enabling the corporations to issue
securities and (b) promoting trade in the securities in the stock market.
Judge-made corporate law, another important source of law, is equally
non-interventionist. The defence of business judgment accepted by the
courts precludes judicial interference in corporate decisions and actions,
except in cases of gross abuse or fraud. Courts are mostly concerned with
the narrow fiduciary duties of corporate managements to the shareholders.
Other than this, corporations have near-complete freedom in arranging
their business and affairs, which has been accurately summarized by
Easterbrook and Fischel.150
When we turn to the stock market, the elaborate regulatory framework that
governs the market, as we have noted earlier, is mostly concerned with
making corporate information available. This approach, tried for the last
70 and more years, has proven its inability to handle the periodic bouts of
speculation which afflict the market, and the market’s tendency to set
irrational and unsustainable price levels. The prospect of increases in
share price is a major temptation for managements to indulge in negative
behaviour, and Enron is (fallen) testimony to this reality. The theory that
appraisal of share prices in the stock market would be guided by the
information provided by companies151 is considerably undermined by the
case-studies made in this essay.
When we consider the question of a role for the stock market, we find that
it has been all of the following:
a. A source of capital for companies for their business needs
b. A venue for the public to invest their savings profitably
c. A platform for existing business owners to divest their holdings,
and broad-base the ownership of business enterprises
d. A forum for trade in the securities of corporations, and enabling
liquidity for the holders

150

Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, note 7, above.

151

Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, note 21, above.
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e. A forum for trade in corporate control through large-scale,
concerted transactions of purchase and sale of shares
f. A significant influence on governance practices in corporations
g. A veritable gambling den
We must pause to question whether the present regulatory framework
takes sufficient note of the multi-faceted role of the stock market, and
whether it effectively deals with each of them. We must also determine
which of these various roles must be encouraged and which ones
discouraged. It would be a serious folly to have speculation in the stock
market as the basis for economic arrangements or for “wealth creation” of
a dubious variety. The need of the hour is a theory for the stock market
that reflects policy choices made in a reasoned manner with due regard to
the interests of all stakeholders.
Instability in the stock market and unhealthy corporate governance are two
major current issues, and the present arrangements have proven that they
are not capable of addressing them. The need of the hour is, therefore,
legal reform of the two institutions – business corporations and the stock
market. The reform effort must take into account the experience which we
have gained with them, and pay sufficient attention to the practical
consequences of the present arrangements and their underlying
philosophy.
The prevailing political climate is hardly encouraging, and there can be
little optimism on the prospects for reform. On the contrary, we can
expect that the very mention of legal reform will provoke strong protests
from business interests, supported by libertarian scholars. But the issues at
stake are too important to be left in the hands of entrenched special
interests and their supporters, although this has been the case for most of
the last thirty years. We must, therefore, persist with a debate on reform,
regardless of how bright or bleak the prospects for actual reform might
appear to be. The case for the legal reform of corporations and the stock
market is strengthened by the following:
a. Business corporations are creatures of law, and when these
creatures of law engage in harmful acts, it would be quite
legitimate for the law to regulate them. The clear and undisputed
status of business corporations as products of law, rather than
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private arrangements provides a strong theoretical justification for
the efforts to regulate them. Such regulation would not, in any
way, curtail the liberties of the people.
b. Stock market is the forum for trade in the securities issued by
corporations. The market might be a societal arrangement that
emerged without state intervention and the laws might have played
little role in its emergence, but the subject of trade in the market
are securities issued by corporations, which are legal creatures.
The stock market hardly deals in natural commodities like food
grains and vegetables, or manufactured commodities like textiles
or industrial products. The securities traded in the stock market are
legal instruments that have special characteristics in law, and they
greatly influence and shape the trends and tendencies in the
market. This distinction calls for a special variety of regulation.152
The first step in a meaningful reform effort would be to formulate sound
theories about the two institutions, in terms of the role that we expect them
to play. This variety of theorizing about the law and legal framework, and
preparing elaborate legal codes are alien to the common law tradition,
which prefers to rely on spontaneous arrangements emerging in the society
endogenously. While such a conception of the law would be natural and
quite appropriate for self-contained local communities, they would be out
of place even in small, nation-states, not to speak of the vast,
interconnected and globalized society of the present.
Experience shows the limitations of the bureaucratic, command-andcontrol method of regulation tried in the last about 150 years of the
welfare state, more particularly since the New Deal.153 But there is also
152

Such complex arguments are necessitated by the doctrinal divide between “public”
and “private” in the Anglo-American legal tradition. In more integral systems, they
would not be as important. Moreover, with the adoption of democratic forms of
government in which the laws are made by elected assemblies, the theory is that the laws
represent the consciousness of the people, rather than “commands of the sovereign.” For
this reason, the distinction between public and private ought to diminish, if not get
effaced.
153

See e.g. Milton & Rose Friedman, Free to Choose: A Personal Statement (New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980).
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increasing realization that the deregulation tried since the 1980s and
enlargement of the role of the state that has accompanied the process have
mostly benefited the special interests which either hold or are close to
controlling power.154 It is, therefore, vital that any roadmap for reform
avoids dogmatic and doctrinaire approaches either in favour of or against
regulation, and works towards solutions that advance the common good,
rather than special interests.

154

See e.g. Joseph E. Stiglitz, note 26, above.

